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Abstract
The M26 tank, nicknamed the “General Pershing,” was the final result of the Ordnance
Department’s revolutionary T20 series. It was the only American heavy tank to be fielded during
the Second World War. Less is known about this tank, mainly because it entered the war too late
and in too few numbers to impact events. However, it proved a sufficient design – capable of
going toe-to-toe with vaunted German armor. After the war, American tank development slowed
and was reduced mostly to modernization of the M26 and component development. The Korean
War created a sudden need for armor and provided the impetus for further development. M26s
were rushed to the conflict and demonstrated to be decisive against North Korean armor.
Nonetheless, the principle role the tank fulfilled was infantry support. In 1951, the M26 was
replaced by its improved derivative, the M46. Its final legacy was that of being the foundation of
America’s Cold War tank fleet.
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Introduction
The study of armor during the Second World War tends to be either overemphasized or
underappreciated. When it comes to the M26 Pershing, the United States’ first production heavy
tank to be fielded as an answer to the German Tiger tank, historical emphasis has been on the
latter. The tank showed up too late in the war to have a lasting impact and after the war was won
it enjoyed only a brief service life. It was important in Korea, but even there it was replaced by
its improved variant, the M46, after not even a year in country. The M26 was significant,
however. Its existence helped stabilize sagging American morale when American forces were
faced with an armor crisis in 1944, and its success in action in 1945 reaffirmed the integrity of
the American armor developmental program. The tank’s interwar developments helped to serve
as an unintended bridge between the armor needs of the Second World War and after. The M26’s
service in Korea was instrumental in this development.
Admittedly, the M26 had its flaws. It was underpowered and sluggish when compared to
the M4 Sherman. Mobility wise, (in rugged terrain) it was not the equal of the M4 Sherman, and
its torqmatic transmission had considerable teething issues, but it was better than many give
credit. For example, in Korea, its lower and wider stance was more controllable on ice than the
M4, a value to tankers on narrow cliff-hugging mountain roads. Most importantly, however, the
Pershing spurred future tank developments and, as the first modern American heavy tank, served
as the basic platform upon which the iconic Patton series--M46, M47, M48, and M60--would be
based. In total, over 36,000 Patton series (1,160 M46, 8,576 M47, approx. 12,000 M48, and
approx. 15,000 M60) tanks were built, representing the backbone of America’s frontline armored
force for more than three decades.1
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The numbers given are approximate. Hunnicutt’s work on the Patton Series was consulted to find exact
production numbers, but no production reference data is given. This is likely due to the large number or models and
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Several historians have included the basic story of the General Pershing as part of their
telling of the wider story of the closing year of the European Theatre of Operations in World
War II. George Forty, for example, in his United States Tanks of World War II in Action (1983),
devotes a brief eight-page chapter to the M26 entitled “The Tiger Tamer.” Forty summarizes the
developmental history, combat action, and wartime variants of the M26. He concludes the
chapter with a brief judgement on “How good was the Pershing?”, wherein deferring to Richard
Hunnicutt’s assessment.2 Christopher Foss’s The Encyclopedia of Tanks and Armored Fighting
Vehicles (2002) also gives a one-page write-up on the M26 that provides a surprisingly detailed
summary of the tank’s specifications and wartime existence. He interestingly points out that the
British received several Pershings for testing before war’s end.3
Charles Bailey’s Faint Praise: American Tanks and Tank Destroyers during World War
II (1983) should also be noted. This book was the first to look at the heated debate between the
Ordnance Department and the Army Ground Forces (AGF) over the fielding of the T26.
Regarding the question of why was the T26 not fielded sooner, Bailey comes down hard on the
Army Ordnance program and points to Lieut. Gen. Leslie McNair, commander AGF, as the
Ordnance Department’s scapegoat.4 His arguments have much merit and are worthy of study.

variants that existed for each basic type, making tabulation very difficult. See R. P. Hunnicutt, Patton: A History of
the American Main Battle Tank, vol. 1 (Brattleboro, Vermont: Echo Point Books & Media, 1984).
2
George Forty, United States Tanks of World War II in Action (Dorset, U.K.: Blandford Press, 1983), 140141. For Hunnicutt’s assessment see: R. P. Hunnicutt, Pershing: A History of the Medium Tank T20 Series
(Brattleboro, Vermont: Echo Point Books & Media, 2015), 199-202. Hunnicutt compares the PzKpfw V ausf. G,
Panther, PzKpfw VI ausf. E, Tiger I, and M26 Pershing (T26E3). Looking at firepower, mobility, and protection,
Hunnicutt remarks “The Pershing, Panther, and Tiger I were close enough in fighting power so that each could
defeat the others under favorable circumstances….the Pershing on occasion destroyed both German vehicles and
was in turn knocked out by them.” (199) Hunnicutt ranks the Panther first, followed by the Pershing and then the
Tiger I. (200)
3
Christopher F. Foss, ed. The Encyclopedia of Tanks and Armored Fighting Vehicles: The Comprehensive
Guide to Over 900 Armored Fighting Vehicles From 1915 to the Present Day (San Diego, California: Thunder Bay
Press, 2002), 38.
4
Charles M. Baily, Faint Praise: American Tanks and Tank Destroyers during World War II (Hamden,
CT: Archon Books, 1983), 140 and 142.
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Alternatively, the excellent United States Army in World War II series, The Technical Services,
written by the Ordnance Department immediately following the war, unsurprisingly offer a very
pro-Ordnance narrative. The Ordnance Department’s arguments concerning the T20 series are
specifically contained in Constance Green’s The Ordnance Department: Planning Munitions for
War (2017) and Lida Mayo’s, The Ordnance Department: On Beachhead and Battlefront (2009).
Despite the clear Ordnance bent, these works are impressive and use a wide range of sources
employed. Both works have brief but dedicated sections devoted to the history of the
T26E3/M26.5
Marc Milner, in his Stopping the Panzers (2014), provides a thorough account of Allied
action, specifically Canadian, during and after D-Day but largely ignores the Pershing. He does
however allude to John Toland’s The Last 100 Days (1966) for the details of the Pershing in
action in Germany, specifically during the advance on the Rhine River and the dramatic capture
of the Ludendorff Bridge at Remagen on March 7-8 1945.6 Andrew Rawson’s Remagen Bridge
(2004), is an excellent companion to this pivotal battle, which involved the Pershing’s part. No
study of the M26 is complete without a viewing of the January 1945 War Department TM9-735:
Pershing Heavy Tank T26E3 Technical Manual, and its valuable detailed descriptions,
schematics, and operating instructions.
The M26 Pershing played a pivotal role in the first year of the Korean War. As such,
Korean War historians have given it greater attention. Roy Appleman’s excellent addition to the
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For sections in official histories devoted to M26 see: Lida Mayo, The Ordnance Department: On
Beachhead and Battlefront, United States Army in World War II, The Technical Services (Washington, D. C.:
Center of Military History United States Army, 2009), 237-239, 278-288, 328-338, 404, 473. Also see, Constance
M. Green, Harry C. Thomson, and Peter C. Roots, The Ordnance Department: Planning Munitions for War, United
States Army in World War II, The Technical Services (Washington, D. C.: Center of Military History United States
Army, 2017), 236-239, 278-288, 512.
6
For a highly detailed account of the capture of the Ludendorff Bridge from both allied and German
perspectives, see John Toland, The Last 100 Days: The Tumultuous and Controversial Story of the Final Days of
World War II in Europe (New York: Modern Library, 2003), 202-211.
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United States Army in the Korean War series, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (1992),
gives specific detail on the M26 and M46. Appleman’s exhaustive work is completely
constructed from primary sources and frequently mentions armor engagements throughout.
Almost exclusively, Appleman relies on H. W. MacDonald’s Operation Research Office (ORO)
report, The Employment of Armor in Korea (1951), for his armor accounts. The report provides
an invaluable assessment of the M26 while the cordite was still fresh in the air. MacDonald’s
account is quick to praise the Pershing’s operational successes and defend its maintenance
performance while making informed future recommendations. However, his closeness to the
action does limit his work. As an example, he cites the M26 as being more mobile than the T-34,
an assessment that was simply not true.7 While excellent, neither Appleman nor MacDonald’s
works were intended as stand-alone histories, focused strictly on the M26, and neither gives any
real perspective from the turret.
Only two authors have attempted to tell the M26’s full story: Richard Hunnicutt and
Steven Zaloga. Both Hunnicutt and Zaloga have conducted extensive research and produced the
most detailed analysis to date. Hunnicutt’s Pershing: A History of the Medium Tank T20 Series
(1996), a 238-page bolt-by-bolt study, is without argument the defining work on the M26.
Zaloga’s works serve as a good supplement to Hunnicutt’s perspective. Zaloga tells the story in
Osprey’s New Vanguard Series M26/M46 Pershing Tank. He then takes his study a step further
in Osprey’s Duel Series and conducts a fascinating comparison between the M26 and both the
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H. W. MacDonald et al., The Employment of Armor in Korea. (Operations Research Office, General
Headquarters, Far East Command, 1951), 54. MacDonald writes: “The US tanks, especially the M46, are equal or
superior in mobility and probably are equal in agility to the T34.” For a fair assessment of mobility see Steven J.
Zaloga, T-34-85 vs M26 Pershing: Korea 1950, Duel, no. 32 (Oxford, UK: Osprey Publishing Ltd., 2010), 31.
Zaloga argues: “In terms of basic automotive performance, the T-34-85 had marginally better speed and range than
its American opponents….As the T-34-85 was light, it had a slightly better power-to-weight ratio compared to the
M4A3E8, and a markedly better ratio compared to the M26.”

5
Tiger I and T-34/85 in Pershing vs Tiger and T-34/85 vs M26 Pershing respectively. The works
of both men remain largely focused on the developmental history of the Pershing, placing greater
detail on each developmental hurdle crossed rather than fully fleshing out the greater narrative at
large. They do provide some narrative, however, and to be fair, both accounts include a combat
history and expand on variants and service life. Both as well cover the M26 from conception to
retirement but the minutia that is focused on is largely developmental in nature and somewhat
lacking in first-person anecdotal quality.
This thesis builds upon the works of Hunnicutt and Zaloga and could not have been
completed without their extensive works. However, a study of, and in many cases a rehashing of,
their arguments remains critical. Hunnicutt and Zaloga’s works are each handicapped when it
comes to the narrative. Hunnicutt is considered the best source on American tanks because he
studied and included every minute aspect of every variation of each tank. The double edge here
is that it becomes easy for all but the most ardent tank enthusiast to get bogged down in the
attention to detail, specifically the thoroughness to every developmental change that occurred.
For Zaloga’s part, all of his works pertaining to the T26E3/M26 are Osprey Publishing books,
and therein lies the opposite problem. These books are excellent and are highly recommended,
but from a historical standpoint are often too narrowly focused. Topically devoted ride-a-long
histories are needed to supplement. The Osprey books normally only cover a limited slice of
each topic in question and divide coverage of the topic into as many small books as possible.
Osprey has employed Zaloga’s talents to produce three works directly pertaining to the
M26, the same three mentioned above. Two are from the Duel series, namely Pershing vs Tiger:
Germany 1945 (2017) and T-34-85 vs M26 Pershing: Korea 1950 (2010), both at 80 pages, and
the other is a fairly comprehensive dedicated study, M26/M46 Pershing Tank, 1943-1953 (2000),
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at a brisk 48 pages. The capitalistic effort is commendable, but the end result, necessarily
abbreviated and forced together narratives, leaves the reader jumping from one work to another
to assemble a fuller understanding. Zaloga, no doubt knows this and adds value by writing each
storyline with a different thrust. But this approach also reveals problems as Zaloga’s works, on
occasion, offer conflicting evidences. For example, in M26/46 he records that, due to misplaced
trust in the 76mm gun, Eisenhower turned down T26 production.8 In Pershing vs. Tiger however,
Zaloga states otherwise, mentioning that Eisenhower endorsed the tank’s production during the
same period.9
In the tank world, Hunnicutt and Zaloga’s works are the monoliths against which all
others are compared, and, rightly so; however, both historians never include footnotes, making
follow-up study a nightmare. Zaloga does give further reading lists, whereas Hunnicutt lists his
sources at the end of his work but gives no detailed location information. This omission and the
others above suggest that there is still room for an exhaustive study of this important armored
fighting vehicle (AFV). This thesis only scratches the surface on the total sources available.
Moreover, fresh sets of eyes on the same archival materials will undoubtedly create exciting new
and important arguments. To a very limited degree, that took place with this work. This thesis
offers a narrative-friendly perspective that includes personal accounts and uses new sources
wherever possible. It attempts to linger where Zaloga and Hunnicutt have summarized,
particularly with combat accounts of the M26 and in the telling of the controversially slow
fielding of the Pershing.

8

Steven J. Zaloga, Tony Bryan, and Jim Laurier, M26/M46 Pershing Tank, 1943-1953, New Vanguard, no.
35 (Oxford, UK: Osprey Publishing Ltd., 2000), 11.
9
Steven J. Zaloga, Pershing vs Tiger: Germany 1945. Duel, no. 80 (Oxford, UK: Osprey Publishing Ltd.,
2017), 18.
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Research efforts for this work, outside of secondary sources, were divided between
perusing the papers of General Jacob L. Devers at the York County Historical Center in York,
Pennsylvania, studying the Ernest Nason Harmon and John William Leonard Papers at the U.S.
Army Heritage and Research Center (USAHEC) in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, and mining for
sources at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), College Park, Maryland.
USAHEC has a wealth of first-hand accounts from interviews with soldiers made after the battle
for Remagen, some of which are incorporated below. Many Ordnance records are located at
National Archives, especially extensive production numbers and testing reports. Additionally,
the Library of Congress holds the Charles L. Scott Papers, the findings of his 1944 report are
mentioned further below. Finally, the Marshall Research Library, in Lexington Virginia, houses
the Thomas T. Handy Papers and several rare books, like Baily’s Faint Praise: American Tanks
and Tank Destroyers during World War II. I owe a special thanks to the highly professional staff
at all of these sites. Their patience and guidance were instrumental in the creation of this thesis.
However, any deficiencies in research are my own.
The first chapter traces the developmental of the T20 series, culminating in the M26 tank.
Where the aforementioned Hunnicutt and Zaloga have amassed research, this chapter will
attempt to summarize, largely relying on their expertise for reference. The chapter is devoted to
the intricacies of the doctrinal showdown and developmental foot-dragging that was involved
with the fielding of the Pershing, however it opens with a detailed, and perhaps tedious,
description of the M26. This is useful for the reader to not only conceptualize the basic
capabilities and characteristics of this tank, but to serve as a reference to complement the
narrative and personal accounts in the following chapters. The developmental story of the T20
series is told, and emphasis is placed on the personal opinions and decisions of General Leslie
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McNair, AGF commander, Lieut. Gen. Jacob Devers, the head of the Armored Force and later
commander of the ETO, and Brig. Gen. Gladeon Barnes, the Chief of the Ordnance
Department’s Research and Development Branch, and the later head of the Zebra Project.
General Dwight Eisenhower and George Marshall also had key parts to play. The chapter’s
closing is devoted to revealing personal accounts showing the need for a better American tank in
1944.
The second chapter focuses strictly to the M26’s combat experience in the Second World
War, relying heavily upon several of the United States Army in World War II volumes as well as
Zaloga’s comparisons with the Tiger, but providing a more comprehensive approach by
combining all available accounts into one telling. Specific attention is given to the combat action
of the T26E3 tanks of the Zebra project. A following brief chapter is devoted to the interwar
period where many of the tests for this tank finally took place. The new developmental currents
that took place are also navigated.
Tests at Aberdeen Proving Grounds and the Armored Board, Fort Knox, Kentucky, are
heavily relied upon as well as the findings of a 1950 Congressional subcommittee on tanks
tasked with briefing President Truman, though the latter was actually released after the Korean
War had started. The final two chapters are devoted to the service of the M26 in Korea. The first
offers complete narrative of nearly all tank-verses-tank combat seen by the Pershing, while the
last reveals the additional roles this tank fulfilled during the war. The thesis closes by
summarizing the key arguments and briefly looking at the developmental legacy of the Pershing.
In all chapters, as much as possible, first-hand accounts accompany the narrative.
The end result of this thesis is that it employs many available primary sources relating to
the M26, heavily incorporates the work of leading tank historians, and gleans from the great
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primary works on World War II and Korea, to create thorough history that is Pershing-centric.
By combining of multiple sources into a single narrative, as well as adding personal accounts, it
provides a fuller understanding of an underappreciated weapon in American military history.
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Chapter 1 - Development of the T26
The T26E3, which became standardized as the heavy tank M26 (nicknamed General
Pershing) in March of 1945 after it entered combat in the ETO, was described in its technical
manual as a “heavily armored, full track-laying, low silhouette combat vehicle with a 90-mm gun
mounted in a fully enclosed power-operated turret which can be traversed 360 degrees. The
vehicle is powered by an 8-cylinder, V-type, liquid-cooled, Ford, model GAF, gasoline tank
engine.” Under the heading ‘Construction Features,’ the manual mentions that “The vehicle is
supported on its steel tracks by twelve dual road wheels with individual torsion bar springs, and
four large cylindrical shock absorbers on each side….The upper portion of the track is covered
by stowage boxes, fenders, and sand shields at the ends and sides."1
The T26E3 was 109.4 inches (9 feet 1 inches) tall, 138.3 inches (11 feet 6 inches) wide,
and 249.1 inches (20 foot 9 inches) long (without the gun, which added another 91.4 inches).2 It
weighed 46.2 tons (92,355 pounds) fully loaded. It had six dual roadwheels to a side and a rear
mounted drive sprocket that had 13 teeth.3 At the front of each track it had a 26 x 6 inch forward
idler, used to keep the vehicle’s tracks taut.4 Two different types of all-steel center-guided tracks
were used, namely the 24-inch-wide single pin (T81) and the 23 inch wide double pin (T80E1).
The tracks were kept in place by five return rollers at the top of each side, equally spaced
between the sprocket and idler.

1

War Department, Pershing Heavy Tank T26E3 Technical Manual, TM 9-735 (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1945), 3.
2
Hunnicutt, Pershing History, 217.
3
Ibid.
4
U.S. Army, FB-191 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1945) quoted in Jeff Quitney,
“Pershing Tank ‘The Heavy Tank T26E3’ p1-2 1945 US Army FB-191” (video), 8 July, 2014, accessed on 24
March, 2018, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XWF83bNq_LQ The video refers to the idler as the “compensator
wheel,” see 2:46.
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The T26E3 was well armed and armored, especially frontally, with 4 inches of rolled and
cast homogenous steel angled at 46 degrees for the glacis plate, and 3 inches of armor sloped at
53 degrees for the bottom plate.5 The heaviest armor on the tank was the cast steel T99E1 gun
shield, at 4 ½ inch thick (not sloped, but rounded), while the rest of the turret front was at 4
inches; the sides and rear of the turret were 3 inches thick.6 The T26E3 had 3-inch thick armor
on the forward side armor and 2-inch thick armor at rearward. Two-inch armor protected the
upper rear of the tank, while 3/4 inch the bottom rear. Seven Eighths (.875) inch armor protected
the top.7 The bottom front of the tank was protected by 1-inch of armor and the bottom rear had
only ½ inch. The T26E3’s turret was large, but fit the same diameter turret ring as the medium
tank M4 (Sherman), at 69 inches (measured internally).8 It housed the powerful M3 90-mm (3.54
inch) gun, and, thanks to a ten-round ready rack in the turret, in combination with stowage bins
in the hull floor, could carry 70 rounds of ammunition.9 It also had one .50 caliber HB M2
machine gun on the turret roof in a flexible AA mount, and two .30 caliber M1919A4 machine
guns, one mounted coaxially to the main gun and the other in a bow mount.10
The T26E3’s 90-mm gun M3 could hurl a 23.29-pound high explosive (HE) projectile
17,885 meters (11.1 miles).11 An armored piercing (AP) shell had a range of 3,200 meters (2
miles). The weight of the gun and tube was 3,725 pounds (1.86 tons); it took the turret 17
seconds to hydraulically traverse 360 degree (21.2 degrees per second).12 The gun could be
elevated 20 degrees and depressed 10. The maximum rate of ‘aimed’ fire was eight rounds a

5

Hunnicutt, Pershing History, 217.
Ibid.
7
Ibid.
8
Ibid.
9
Ibid.
10
Ibid.
11
90-mm Gun M3 Mounted in Combat Vehicles, War Department, TM 9-374 (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1944), 12, 90. (Hereafter M3 Manual)
12
Ibid., 7, 12. It could also be manually traversed at a slower rate.
6
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minute.13 The max rate of fire could be maintained for 160 rounds, or 20 minutes, before causing
damage to the barrel. One round a minute could be fired indefinitely without fear of damage.
Five different types of live shells were available: the M71 HE, the M77 AP, an
obsolescent model used for training only, the T33 AP-T (tungsten), M82 APC-T (armor piercing
capped-tungsten, described in detail further below), and the T30E16 HVAP-T (hyper velocity
armor piercing – tungsten, described below). The T33 AP-T shell was a modification of the
obsolete M77 AP, specifically it was reheat-treated to increase its harness, and a windshield was
added to improve aerodynamic performance.14 The HE and AP shells left the gun at a respectable
2,700 fps, while the APC round moved at a comparable 2,670 fps.15 The HVAP round, however,
screamed out of the barrel at 3,350 fps. The manual describes the purpose of the HVAP
ammunition as follows:
This is a special hyper-velocity, armor piercing round for attack of heavily
armored vehicles. It gives greatly increased penetrative performance up to 2,000
yards range over the standard A.P.C.-T., Projectile, 90mm, M82. It is especially
effective at shorter ranges. Since tungsten carbide is a critical material these
projectiles should be used sparingly and only when the situation requires
increased armor penetration. The shot will penetrate all plates of the German Pz
Kpfw V “Panther” and “King Tiger” Tanks. IT WILL DEFEAT THE GLACIS
PLATE OF THE “PANTHER” AT RANGES UP TO 450 YARDS AND OF
THE “KING TIGER” AT 100 YARDS RANGE. UP TO RANGES OF 800
YARDS THE SHOT WILL PENETRATE THE GUN MANTLET AND
TURRET FRONT OF BOTH THE “PANTHER” AND “KING TIGER”
TANKS.16
The purpose of the T33 AP-T round is highlighted in the Ordnance manual similarly as follows:
“This is the most effective shot for the defeat of high obliquity caliber thickness homogeneous

13

Research Analysis Corporation (RAC),“Technical Situation Report No. 38, September 18, 1945,”
Quoted in “90-mm Gun M3 and M3A1 Rate of Fire,” May 6, 2017, War Thunder (blog), accessed on 25 March,
2018. https://forum.warthunder.com/index.php?/topic/362945-id0057186-12may2017-90mm-gun-m3-and-m3a1rate-of-fire/ (hereafter referred to as RAC Report).
14
Armor-Piercing Ammunition for Gun, 90-mm, M3, Office of the Chief of Ordnance (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1945), 6. (Hereafter M3 Ammunition)
15
M3 Manual, 7.
16
M3 Ammunition, 1.
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armor plate. The shot will defeat all plates of the German Pz Kpfw V “Panther” Tank except the
gun mantlet. IT WILL PENETRATE THE GLACIS OF the “PANTHER” TANK UP TO 1,100
YARDS RANGE.”17
In addition to first rate ammunition, the T26E3 boasted excellent fire control and vision
devices. The gunner’s primary sight was the M10F periscope, which featured a x6 power
telescope for normal engagements and a unity sight for observation and close-quarters
engagements.18 Additionally, the gunner had the x5 power M71C auxiliary telescope as a backup if his primary sight went down. It is of interest that, the M71C was mounted very low and
near to the gun barrel so it could alternatively be used to see if the gun was clear of nearby
obstructions before firing.19 The commander’s cupola, on the right side of the turret, contained
six direct vision prisms which offered a 360-degree view from inside the tank as well. The
cupola was on rollers and had an azimuth scale built in so the commander could quickly
reference, with great accuracy, his viewed direction/target direction in relation to the gun.20
However, when the tank commander rode with his hatch opened over rough terrain, it had a
nasty habit of working its way loose, swinging forward, and striking him in the head.21 The
tank’s loader also had his own hatch on the left side of the turret, as well as a pistol port from
which he could fire on nearby ground forces.
The pistol port also proved useful for venting gun fumes if they built up inside the turret,
as well as providing a convenient means of throwing expended 90-mm brass outside of the tank
during combat, thus avoiding them from piling up at the tank crew’s feet. The T20 series had a

17

Ibid., 6.
Nicholas Moran, “Inside the Chieftain’s Hatch: M26 “Pershing” Part 2,” The Chieftain (video),
September 19, 2012, accessed March 18, 2018, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_gONk5PS4zM.
19
Ibid.
20
Ibid.
21
Ibid. Moran mentions the manual recommending a field expedient fix, drilling holes through the hatch
system and installing a cotter pin.
18
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Rotoclone blower mounted in the hull front that could cycle air in the crew compartment at a rate
of 400 cubic feet per minute, keeping fumes from building up under normal conditions. The
positioning of the blower created a distinctive armored-covered, bulge at the top center of the
glacis plate, just below the turret. This bulge is an identifying feature and is characteristic of
every model of the T20 series as well as the M46 tank. Both of the drivers had their own hatches
and dedicated periscope. The assistant driver/ bow gunner had his own complete set of driving
controls, but his normal responsibility was to his bow gun. He used the tracers of his machine
gun to walk fire onto targets. Additionally, each driver had an escape hatch located in the floor of
the hull underneath him.
The T26E3 used a torque converter transmission with three forward and one reverse
gears. The T26E3 and the M18 Hellcat tank destroyer used essentially the same, Torqmatic 900T built by the Detroit Transmission Division of General Motors, and were the only two
American vehicles to employ a torqmatic transmission during the war.22 The transmission was
developed through the combination of a Hydraulic Torque Converter with a three planetary gear
arrangement of the Hydra-Matic transmission. A 1944 General Motors publication declared that
the torqmatic “…could accomplish new wonders in the heavy vehicle field.”23 Similarly, the
manual boasted that it “…practically relieves the driver of all concerns about transmission
shifting except under extreme conditions, and leaves him free to concentrate on his other

22

David D. Jackson, “Detroit Transmission (Hydra-Matic) Division of General Motors Corporation in
World War Two: The Detroit Transmission Torqmatic Model 900-T – as used in the M18 Hellcat Tank Destroyer
and M26 Pershing,” The American Automobile Industry in World War Two: An American Auto Industry Heritage
Tribute, December 27 2016, accessed on April 6 2018,
http://usautoindustryworldwartwo.com/General%20Motors/detroittransmission-%20the%20Torqmatic%20transmission%20900-T.htm.
23
Detroit Transmission Division, Teamwork in Peace and War (Detroit, Michigan: General Motors
Corporation, 1944), 27.
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functions.”24 Despite these in-house endorsements, an electrical drive was favored for the T20
series and took the lead until testing proved it impractical in mid-1943, thereafter, the torqmatic
was permanently adopted.
The T26E3 was powered by the gasoline Ford GAF engine, developing 500 hp at 2600
rpms.25 In combination with the torqmatic transmission, it could go to 9 mph in the first gear, 18
mph in the second, and up to 30 in the third (sustainable road speed was typically 25 mph on
level ground).26 The T26E3 could handle a sixty percent grade and could negotiate an eight foot
wide trench.27 Steering was managed by the application of the brake to one side of the
differential at a time, so forward momentum was required to turn, negating the ability to neutralsteer.28 Its turning radius was 20 feet. The T26E3 had a four-cylinder auxiliary motor for driving
the generator to charge the batteries as well as operation of electrical equipment (such as the
turret motor) when the main Ford engine was not running.29 It generated 13.6 hp at a constant
1,800 rpms. The vehicle had two large fuel tanks, one on the left side of the engine compartment,
holding 116 gallons, and one on the right, holding only 75 gallons, because room was needed for
the auxiliary engine.30 Eighty octane gasoline was used to fill them. The T26E3 had an operating
range of approximately 100 miles (using roads), for a consumption rate of about ½ mile per
gallon.
The development of the T20 series began in April 1942, after Lt. Col. Joseph M. Colby,
Chief of the Ordnance Department Development Branch, returned from North Africa. The
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production of the medium tank M4 (General Sherman) was just coming into full stride, and given
its performance in the desert, many considered it the best tank on the battlefield.31 However, an
unsettling trend of German armor gaining increased firepower and protection had been
identified. The J model of the Panzer III or Mark III (Pz.Kpfw. III Ausf. J) had increased front
armor and used a long 5cm L/60 cannon (L/60 denotes the length of the gun in calibers) and had
been employed in force during the Battle of Gazala in late May 1942.32 Soon after, a new version
of the Panzer IV or Mark IV (Pz.Kpfw. IV Ausf. F2) was fielded employing a 7.5cm KwK 40
gun (KwK denotes tank cannon, while 40 represents the year of development), significantly
more powerful than the 75-mm gun employed on the Sherman.33
The Ordnance Department declared it time for the development of a successor for the
main American medium tank.34 The new tank needed improvements in all three basic concerns
of tank design, namely, firepower, mobility, and protection, and would take advantage of new
advances made in technology while incorporating lessons learned from the battlefield.35 Maj.
Gen. Gladeon M. Barnes, Chief of the Ordnance Department Research and Development
Service, and Lt. Col Colby conceptualized the new tank and a mock-up was constructed by the
Product Study Division of General Motors Corporation in May 1942.36 General Jacob L. Devers,
Chief of the Armored Force, headquartered at Fort Knox, Kentucky, and General Brehon B.
Somervell, head of the Army Service Force (ASF), both approved of the new design, which was
soon designated the T20 by the Ordnance Department.37
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The T20 design was a revolutionary American design and improved upon the Sherman in
many ways. The propulsion layout of the Sherman emulated German designs in that its engine
was rearward in its own compartment but the transmission was placed in the front of the tank
between the driver and assistant driver/bow gunner (radio operator/bow gunner in German
tanks). The transmission was then linked through the differential and final drive to a drive
sprocket wheel in the front of the tank that propelled the vehicle. This forward powered
arrangement eliminated lengthy linkages and steering controls to the driver’s position, but
required a power shaft to be run the length of the vehicle from the engine to the transmission.
This shaft, coupled with the large diameter Continental R975 radial engine (an adaption of an
airplane engine) of the earlier models, made the M4 very tall, seen best by its characteristic side
sponsons (armored vertical projections that served as the hull’s sides).38
The T20 eliminated the vehicle-length shaft by placing the engine, transmission,
differential, final drive, and sprocket all at the rear of the vehicle in a well-thought-out and
space-saving configuration. A low-profile Ford GAN engine (developing 500 hp at 2600 rpm)
was used, essentially the same motor as the Ford GAA in the M4A3 (Sherman) only modified
for a low-silhouette vehicle.39 These modifications allowed for a substantial reduction in overall
vehicle height of 14 inches.40 Barnes and Colby also sought to provide advantage to the T20 by
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removing the “work” of the tank driver’s job. They installed a torqmatic transmission and the
steering was “one finger.” Installation of an automatic transmission went hand in hand with a
rear-powered-sprocket design, as it again eliminated the necessity of running gear linkages the
length of the vehicle to the driver’s position.
The greatest ingenuity of the T20, however, was in its hull design. Barnes and Colby
realized that by reducing the total space volume of the hull, an increased amount of armor could
be added while still maintaining a comparable weight. As such, they went with a very simple
boxlike structure that minimized volume wherever possible.41 Much of the Sherman’s equipment
was stowed internally inside the crew compartment. The T20, in contrast, moved all nonessential
items outside the hull and into stowage bins placed over the tracks. The overall reduction in
volume allowed the T20, which had the same armor layout as the Sherman, to weigh three tons
less--- 32.9 tons (65,758 pounds) as opposed to 36 tons (72,000 pounds) (both are combat loaded
weights).42 The new design was also much wider, at 138 inches (11 feet 6 inches), to the
Sherman’s 106.8 inches (8.9 feet).43
The lower, wider design had several advantages. First and foremost, its lower stance
presented less target for the enemy to engage. The lower silhouette reduced “…by twenty-five
percent the area of profile of hull which may be hit.”44 A survey completed after the war
determined that 31 percent of gunfire hits on Allied tanks occurred on the turret and 52 percent
on the upper hull, whereas only 17 percent hit the lower portions of the vehicle--- a vehicle
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closer to the ground seemingly had a decreased chance of being hit.45 Tanks assumed a “hull
down” position (defensive posture where the tank was dug in or behind cover and only presented
the turret front to the enemy; though the Americans were often on the offense and did not often
have this luxury) whenever possible; thus, the T20’s silhouette being 14 inches lower to the
ground would have been beneficial in this regard. Furthermore, in a later memorandum to
Brigadier General John K. Christmas, Assistant Chief of the Tank Automotive Center, Colby
pointed out that “it has a lower center of gravity, providing for greater stability of firing platform
and greater obstacle crossing ability.... It has greater width, providing a more stable firing
platform and greater maneuverability.”46
Similarly, the greater width of the vehicle granted better weight distribution, and by
extension, superior mobility. To best compare, the ground pressure on the M4A3 was 14.5
pounds per square inch while the T20’s was 13.5.47 The M4A3, however, as a greatly improved
variant of the Sherman, had been in development longer and efforts had been made prior to
improve its flotation (ability to remain above and keep from digging into soft ground), mainly by
increasing the width of its tracks. Admittedly however, with “duck bill” end connectors added to
the M4A3’s tracks, its footprint was reduced to 12.3 psi.48 Regardless, the comparison here
becomes more telling when the M4A3 is compared with the T26E3, the tank that would become
standardized as the M26 (General Pershing) in March of 1945. The T26E3, despite its combat
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weight of 46.2 tons (92,355 pounds), ten tons heavier than the Sherman, had a ground pressure of
only 12.5 psi.49
The developmental story of the T26E3 and its T20 series predecessors is closely
associated with the ongoing controversy between the Ordnance Department and the Army
Ground Forces (AGF), specifically, the chief of the Ordnance Department’s research section,
Maj. Gen. Gladeon Barnes, and the headquarters of AGF, headed by Lt. Gen. Lesley McNair.50
Interestingly, McNair, an artillery officer (and veteran of the First World War), determined
American armored policy and approved or disapproved of new tank designs. Armor doctrine
under McNair devoted tanks to two specific roles, namely, breakthrough exploitation and
infantry support. Enemy tanks were not to be engaged by American tanks except if unavoidable.
Instead, enemy armor was to be dealt with by reserve tank destroyer units.51
McNair’s policy directed the acquisition of new tanks for the U.S. Army around the
satisfaction of two broad requirements, specifically battle need and battle worthiness. Battle need
initiated new armor designs only after the Armored Force identified problems from the front and
requested new equipment, while battle worthiness emphasized durability, simplicity of design,
ease of maintenance, and reliability, requiring that any tanks (and other equipment) be tested
thoroughly before being sent to foreign theatres. Initial developmental tests were conducted at
Aberdeen proving Ground in Maryland, while operational tests took place afterwards with the
Armored Board, in Fort Knox, Kentucky.52
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Maj. Gen. Barnes disagreed with AGP policy and felt that the combat arms were not
informed on the technical side and that Ordnance should have more autonomy in promoting
designs. As such, the T20 program was in violation of AGF policy as need was never
established; rather, Ordnance went through with the program on its own volition. In the absence
of any user requirements, the designers of the T20 series used the tank as a means of
experimenting with different armaments, transmissions, and suspensions in hopes of finding the
best combination. The program represented a further departure from previous American designs
like the Sherman in that it switched from relying on the engineers at Rock Island Arsenal, Illinois
and Aberdeen Proving Ground, to the far larger pool of talented technicians of the U.S.
automotive industry, specifically Fisher Body of General Motors, in Detroit.53 The people at
Fisher, in large part, after receiving guidance from Barnes, designed and built the T20 series.54
After the contract for the first two T20 pilots was given to the Fisher Body Division, it
was soon expanded by four to allow work on two pilots for each of three pilot series, the T20,
T22, and T23. Each series tested a different transmission, specifically: the T20 and its variants
used a torqmatic transmission (adapted from the one used on the heavy tank M6); the T22
employed a manual transmission (adapted from the 30-30B transmission in the M4); and the T23
series was built with an electric drive (first used in the heavy tank T1E1).55 The precedent of
trying multiple transmissions did not originate with the development of the T20 series, however,
but with that of the heavy tank M6. In order to propel the 60-ton tank, which ultimately proved
an ungainly and overall unsatisfactory design, allowances were made to house a 1000
horsepower Wright Whirlwind engine, the largest engine put into an automotive vehicle up to
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that point.56 Transmission technology of the period could not build a geared transmission that
could handle the corresponding torque of such a motor so the leading engineers of the
automotive industry, specifically the Ordnance Automotive Advisory Committee, were called
upon to design a working drivetrain.57 They decided upon three types of transmissions, namely,
an electric transmission, designed by the General Electric Company, a torque converter
transmission with two speeds, and a hydra-matic.58 Both the electric and torqmatic transmissions
proved effective, though the electric was thought to be the more successful of the two, and were
the direct predecessors of the transmissions used in the T20 series.
At this point in early 1942, the 76-mm (being developed for the tank destroyer M18) was
not yet established, so it was desired to mount other guns for trials on the pilots as well,
specifically a 75-mm with an autoloader, and the 3-inch (76.2 mm) gun M5 (found on the tank
destroyer M10, and the heavy tank M6).59 The 75-mm with autoloader was only mounted on the
number one pilot of the T22 series, while the M5 did not leave the planning board. It was
discovered that the M5 was ballistically identical but weighed significantly more than the 76mm. The remainder of pilots mounted the 76-mm gun. An interesting side note is that the 76-mm
gun was called such, and not “3-inch,” only to avoid confusion with the handling of ammunition.
The weapon had been designed by Barnes and necessarily incorporated a redesigned chamber for
the limited space of the M4 turret, creating rounds of the same caliber but different overall
shape.60
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The designers also desired to test different suspensions. The number two pilot of the T20
series, designated the T20E3 (the T20E2, T22E2, and T23E2 designations were skipped,
presumably, because the pilots mounting the 3 inch gun M5 were dropped), mounted a new
torsion bar suspension, using twelve individually sprung roadwheels (six to a side), measuring 26
x 4.5 inches each.61 This was the first time a torsion bar suspension had been used by the
Ordnance department.62 The remainder of the pilots utilized a more traditional variation of the
Chrystie-style vertical volute spring suspension (VVSS) and the horizontal volute spring
suspension (HVSS), made famous by the M4. This system employed twelve roadwheels in six
bogies (three bogies per track), with each roadwheel measuring 20 x 9 inches. 63 All of the T20
pilots used the same type of 16 9/16” width tracks as the M4 as well.64
In January 1943, a conference between Ordnance and the Armored Force allowed some
discussion of the design and led to improvements concerning the sitting heights of the drivers, as
well as enlargement of their main hatches.65 Ordnance hoped to begin production to replace the
M4 series in 1944, arguing for the need to stay ahead of German development. In April 1943,
Ordnance presented the T23 pilot to Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall, McNair,
and the head of the Armored Force, Lieut. Gen. Jacob Devers. 66 An informal agreement to
produce 250 was made on site. The number one T20 pilot was ready by May 1943, but by that
spring, Ordnance placed all serious consideration towards the T23 design.67 In July 1943, Barnes
recommended that the T23E3 be standardized as the medium tank M27 and the T20E3, with
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torqmatic drive and torsion bar suspension, as the M27B1.68 The Armored Board at Ft. Knox,
Kentucky, opposed the measure because of strong reservations with the untested electric drive,
believing it impractical, both in operational terms and in maintenance requirements. Nonetheless,
Ordnance was still permitted to produce fifty T23E3s for developmental purposes.
In April 1943, the ASF, which managed the U.S. industrial effort, approved production of
250 T23E3s. Production of the tanks began in November 1943 and finished in December 1944.69
The T23E3 was armed with the 76-mm gun and had an electric drive and torsion bar suspension.
In May, a 90-mm gun was first mounted on a T23E3. (After reports from Cairo indicated that the
Germans were using their 8.8cm guns to engage tanks in Libya, efforts were begun to adapt the
90-mm anti-aircraft gun for use on tanks and assault guns, culminating in the standardization of
the M3 anti-tank gun in September 1943.70) Barnes supported the move, along with General
Levin H. Campbell, the Chief of Ordnance. Devers, commander of the Armored Force, was in
opposition, however, as he felt the 76-mm was adequate.71 Undaunted, Ordnance moved ahead
towards the creation of a second design mounting the 90-mm.72
The Allies first encountered the Tiger tank on 28 November 1942 during a major British
assault 13 miles west of Tunis, Tunisia.73 However, the Germans had only four of the massive
60-ton tanks employed defensively for their first combat test in North Africa, and they did not
play a crucial role. The United States Army would first encounter the Tiger on 14 February 1943
at the Battle of Kasserine Pass, and again during the invasion of Sicily in July and August of
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1943. On 13 January 1943, a month before the first American encounter, Colonel G. M. Ross
relayed communications between the War Office with the Middle East to the Assistant Chief of
the Tank Automotive Center (TAC), Brigadier General John K. Christmas, informing him about
the German Tiger tank.74 Christmas had the specifications of the Tiger (including exact armor
thicknesses and hardness level) and in at least one case shared the tank’s details, specifically in a
2 August 1943 memorandum with Major General T. J. Hayes, the Chief of the Industrial
Division.75
Interestingly, Christmas foresaw a need for a heavily armored tank “early in 1944.” In a 7
October memorandum to Barnes, Christmas prophetically suggested: “I consider such a demand
[for a heavily armored tank] very likely to arise from our troops overseas. The British are already
very concerned over this and the fact that both the Russians and Germans have such tanks are
signs of the trend developed in very large battles in open country or ‘tank-terrain.”76 Christmas
reflected that it was too late to develop a new design to answer this threat, and after careful
consideration of every American tank currently either in production or development, announced
that, “…regardless of military value the time factor forces us to choose the Medium Tank M4
with ‘auxiliary armor’.”77 He recommended that 1,000 M4s be outfitted with auxiliary armor
“…so as to approach the protection of the Medium Tank T28 [He likely meant the T28 super
heavy tank] and have them ready by 1 March 1944.” By extension, he asked the project be given
high priority and the full backing of the War Department. The modified vehicles would need to
be “…delivered in the U.K. by 1 May 1944; sixty days prior to this (1 March) these tanks must
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leave the tank factories in the United States.”78 As far as it can be determined, Christmas’
recommendations went unheeded.
Similarly, a report from the War Office of the Director Royal Armoured Corps (DRAC)
in London also was ignored. The office recognized Allied armor (British and American) as
inferior and urged, within three years, the production of “…a tank as quickly as possible which is
comparable to the known best of the Axis Forces. At once get out a specification, design, and
commence a tank which is far superior in every characteristic to the PZKW VI.”79 In stark
contrast to American efforts to keep designs conservative, the War Office advocated for heavier
armor:
Improvement in all facilities for obtaining information of the enemy, under
conditions of modern war, have made the achievement of tactical surprise
extremely difficult. The ‘surprise of material’ is, however, still possible and
provided the surprise is big enough, the side gaining such advantage may well
achieve such success as to seriously shorten the war.80
Regarding firepower, the office reaffirmed the tank’s primary role in the exploitation role, but
also suggested that, “…if we are logical…” the tank’s gun should “…be capable of penetration,
at good range, the armour of any tank the Axis Forces are likely to deploy.”81
Notwithstanding the DRAC recommendations and Christmas’ later report failing to
generate excitement, his earlier report on the Tiger gained some traction. It showed concern over
an increased German tank threat: “Mass production of the above described tank is expected soon.
A new Panther design collateral with Tiger has been found in evidence but not confirmed.
Details and photographs are on their way by plane.” The photos and specifications that
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Christmas spoke of were courtesy of the Red Army’s capture of several Panthers during the
Battle of Kursk (July 5-16, 1943), and the Soviets subsequent allowance of British and American
liaison officers in Moscow to photograph one, as well as receive its basic technical data.82
Regardless, the Tiger I was infrequently met and did not affect the tactical situation on the
ground, and hence did not stir up great consternation in the Armored Force; however, the new
tanks were not ignored either and a call went out to the Ordnance Department for heavier armor
and a more powerful gun.
As a result, two more derivatives of the T23E3 were added, namely the T25 and T26,
however, Ordnance’s focus remained on the T23E3.83 It was decided that fifty of the 250 T23E3s
that were to be built should be mounted with the 90mm gun. Forty of these were built with a
three-inch front glacis plate (75 mm) and ten with a four inch (100 mm) and were designated as
the T25 and T26 respectively. Both designs were also given wider tracks. The mandate for the
T26 insisted that it possess “equivalent or superior” armor to the Tiger I.84 Of note, in a
memorandum regarding the early production of a heavily armored tank dated 7 November 1943,
Colby recommended to Christmas the immediate production of the T26.
The Medium Tank, T26, which has 4” of armor at 45 degrees, offers an effective
ballistic front of close to 8”. I recommend production of this vehicle at once,
using the electric drive. The Medium Tank, T26E1, which is basically the same
tank except that it has the torsion bar suspension and Torqmatic transmission, can
be made into a good tank. However, from the standpoint of efficiency and
operation, I feel that the electric drive is definitely superior.85
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However, with the weight beginning to mount on the 42-ton T25 and 47.6-ton T26, the designing
engineers recommended removal of the heavy electric drive in favor of the torqmatic
transmission.86 In August 1943, the new vehicles that reflected this change were designated the
T25E1 and T26E1, now weighing in at 39 and 43.5 tons respectively.87 The move away from the
electric drive with the T25E1 and T26E1 would prove fortuitous, as the T23 would encounter
many issues in testing.
On 22 August, 1944, the Armored Force Board (AFB) reported on tests done to
determine the “suitability of production models [T23] for use by Armored Command.”88 The
report concluded that the production version of the T23 was “not satisfactory for training or
combat…”, citing a myriad of deficiencies including all of the following: failure of the engine
revolution counter on the Ford GAN engine, issues concerning the pulleys, gearing, housing, and
positioning of the Amplidyne drive (electric motor and generator), “control, braking, and/or
steering” being lost upon engine failure, carburation in need of correction, unsatisfactory engine
cooling, inadequate tracks and suspension (thrown tracks were causing a great deal of trouble),
and 76-mm Ammunition stowage measures requiring modification and still being insufficient
afterwards to house the desired 70 rounds per tank minimum.89
The two T25 pilots with an electric drive were still tested in January 1944 at Aberdeen
Proving Grounds and again at Ft. Knox in April.90 A solitary T26 pilot was sent to Ft. Knox in
October 1944, but the test never occurred as the electric drive had met widespread disapproval at
that point and had all but been ruled out. Forty T25E1 and ten T26E1 pilots, with their torqmatic
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transmissions, were produced for at the Fisher Tank Arsenal at Grand Blanc, Michigan from
February to May of 1944 and then sent for testing.91 In May, Aberdeen Proving Grounds deemed
the T26E1 satisfactory, but it was remarked that the turret basket and ammo capacity needed
improving. The Armored Board did not report as favorably.
In a letter dated 25 March, 1944, the Army Ground Forces directed the AFB to test the
T26E1 medium heavy tank (along with the T25E1 medium tank). The AFB reported back on 20
May with their findings after ten days of conducting tests at Fort Knox.92 It reported, “During
this period the Medium Heavy Tank, T26E1, was operated 246 miles over gravel roads and 28
miles cross-country, with an average fuel economy of .694 miles per gallon. No cross-country
operation of this vehicle was observed due to failure of the torqmatic transmission.”93 The board
found that the T26E1 was not “a fightable vehicle.” It could, however, be made so with
modification, specifically: “restowage of the ammunition, general turret stowage… and
correction of the mechanical defects revealed during the tests.”94 The report also singled out
issues with the gun, remarking that the addition of a blast deflector and special propellant
ammunition was a “MUST” to keep the vehicle from being reduced to a “one shot” weapon
(Untrammeled, the blast of the 90-mm gun stirred up great clouds of dust and obstructed the
crew’s view, hindering the possibility of follow-up shots).
When Tigers were encountered in Italy in September of 1943, Barnes advocated that 500
T25s and 500 T26s be produced immediately to allow for their availability in the summer of
1944. Barnes’s request met significant resistance. The Armored Force felt the M4 was adequate
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and that the 90-mm was overkill, and if such a weapon was to be fielded, it should be mounted
on the proven and available Sherman. There was also a general feeling that only a 90-mm M4
could be developed in time for the summer invasion of France. Additionally, Barnes’s track
record was sullied, as he had previously advocated for the fielding of the heavy tank M6 as well
as the T23.95 Since the Armored Force did not endorse Barnes’s request, providing battle need,
McNair’s AGF and the ASF opposed it as well. Barnes appealed to the former commander of the
Armored Board, Lieut. Gen. Devers, who was temporarily covering as the head of ETOUSA in
England until Eisenhower replaced him. Devers was an armor officer who had gone out of his
way to learn much of the technical specifications surrounding tank design, particularly engines,
and he was also a known proponent for an American heavy tank.
On 13 November, 1943, Devers sided with Barnes and requested the development of the
T26E1 be accelerated and that 250 produced as soon as possible at a ratio of one to every five
M4s being built.96 Though the AFB was not on board with the idea, Devers’s request created
battle need, forcing McNair’s hand. Additionally, Barnes concurred with Devers’s request but
added his own recommendation of 1,000 T23s being produced simultaneously.97 The War
Department passed both of these requests on to McNair, who turned them both down flatly. On
30 November, 1943, McNair wrote a letter to Gen. Marshall, stating his position:
There can be no basis for the T26 tank other than the conception of a tank versus
tank duel – which is believed unsound and unnecessary….There is no indication
that the 76mm anti-tank gun is inadequate against the German Mark VI
tank…Certainly the T26 tank, weighing upwards of 43 tons, is not well adapted to
the primary mission of tanks.98
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Additionally, on 21 January 1944, Marshall was advised by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to
not support the T26, but to wait on any ruling until Eisenhower replaced Devers as Commander
ETOUSA. Instead, Marshall deferred to the more qualified opinion of Lt. Gen. Thomas T.
Handy, head of G-4 (operations) General Staff.99 Handy recommended:
…We should go ahead with this project unless Eisenhower reports
unfavorably…The Germans are making and using heavy tanks. It is another case
of having to go ahead without waiting for long field tests. We may make a
mistake and be blamed for it. That is far better than not having a weapon that is
needed.100
Based on Handy’s view, Marshall gave the green light on T26 production. Eisenhower had been
repeatedly told of the excellent attributes of the 76-mm gun and thus believed that the 90-mm
was unnecessary. He therefore viewed the T26E1 as too heavy for only adding armor protection
value and turned down the request.101 With the issue unresolved, ASF appealed to the War
Department to decide the case.102 On 16 December 1943, the War Department ruled that 250
T26E1 tanks should be produced by April 1945.103 The issue was not settled, however, as shortly
after, Washington directed the Armored Board in Fort Knox, Kentucky to find the best solution
for the armor question in 1944.104 The chief of the Armored Center, Gen Charles L. Scott,
headed the team. On 17 April 1944, he reported on his findings. The report pointed to the
supremacy of the M4 in North Africa as being almost immediately eclipsed by German
development efforts, specifically highlighting improvements in “…quality and design of
suspension systems, performance of guns, caliber for caliber, and in fire control equipment.”105
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Scott’s report also called into question AGF-imposed armored doctrine by demonstrating the
importance of superior tanks, in that experience reflected that American armored exploitations
were inevitably counterattacked by German armor.106
Furthermore, the Scott report was skeptical whether either the T25 or the T26 could be
fielded immediately, predicting useful numbers not being available until July of 1945.107 Instead,
it recommended that the turrets for the T25 and T26 be mounted on the M4A3, in a similar
fashion to how the T23 turret was first mounted on an M4A1 in August 1943.108 The AFB
requested that a thousand M4A3s be mounted with 90-mm guns, believing that only the M4
would be available in time for the summer invasion.109 Interestingly, Barnes, the leading
proponent for getting a better tank than the M4 to the battlefield in 1944, did not support the
proposal, believing the 90-mm would make for “too much of an unbalanced design” and turned it
down. He also countered with the argument that the modified M4 could not be produced any
faster than the T25 and T26. Not surprisingly, General McNair rejected the proposal as well.110
In hindsight, this recommendation made a lot of sense, but was not given full consideration.111
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In March 1944, Maj. Gen. Barnes again tried to get tanks of the T20 series into action. He
hoped that combat tests would show to the troops that Ordnance had equipment that met their
needs despite the AGF never requesting them.112 He suggested five each of the T23 and T25, as
well as one T26, be sent to the U.S. Army’s North African Theater of Operations
(NATOUSA).113 Barnes suggested NATOUSA instead of ETOUSA because after his posting in
England, Lt. Gen. Devers was given command of the Mediterranean Theater.114 In predictable
fashion, Gen. McNair argued that the types in question were not battle worthy because they had
not been tested by the Armored Board.
The two armored divisions committed to the initial landings at Normandy sustained 32
percent tank casualties, much higher than the anticipated 7 percent.115 The reports of shockingly
heavy casualties after the landings startled all parties. Eisenhower, in particular, was irate at the
ineffectiveness of the M4’s 76-mm gun and felt he had been deceived. In a conversation with Lt.
Gen. Omar Bradley, Eisenhower fumed: “You mean our 76 won’t knock these Panthers out? I
thought it was going to be the wonder gun of the war….Why is it that I am always the last to
hear about this stuff? Ordnance told me this 76 would take care of anything the Germans had.
Now I find you can’t knock out a damn thing with it.”116 A scramble resulted, and all attention
went to the T26E1, as it offered the best armored protection for its crews. The T25E1 program
was abandoned. Interestingly, on 29 June, 1944, the T26 and all its variants were quietly
redesignated as heavy tanks. 117 This move was no doubt attempted as a means of bolstering
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flagging confidence in American tanks and the Ordnance Department and improving tanker
morale; a tanker in the ETO would no doubt feel better knowing a “heavy tank” was on its way.
In August of 1944, Barnes requested combat testing, yet again. This time he requested a
platoon of T26s be sent to Italy.118 The General Staff supported the proposal, but the AGF
rejected the move, killing it. Barnes would finally receive permission from Secretary of War
Stimson and Marshall.119 At the end of October, Barnes coordinated with the Ordnance Office in
Detroit to ship twenty tanks to the ETO.120 In November, production of the T26E3 began at
Fisher Tank Arsenal in Grand Blanc, Michigan, with ten produced by the end of the month.
Thirty more were produced in December. AGF tried to halt sending the tanks to the ETO by
arguing that since they had not been tested by the Armored Board, they were not battleworthy.121 Barnes objected that such tests would add a month to the tanks’ deployment date.
Meanwhile, following the Battle of the Bulge, Eisenhower learned further of the
dissatisfaction in the armored ranks with the shortcomings of the M4 through press reports,
which harped on the battle being the “costliest in American history.”122 For example, in January
1945, New York Times journalist Hanson Baldwin wrote:
Why at this late stage in the war are American tanks inferior to the enemy’s? That
they are inferior the fighting in Normandy showed, and the recent battles in the
Ardennes have again emphatically demonstrated. This has been denied, explained
away and hushed up, but the men who are fighting our tanks against much
heavier, better armored and more powerfully armed German monsters know the
truth. It is high time that Congress got to the bottom of a situation that does no
credit to the War Department. This does not mean that our tanks are bad. They are
not; they are good. They are the best tanks in the world—next to the Germans.123
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The press were making the situation out to be a full-blown crisis, a reaction that benefitted no
one, so the Supreme Allied Commander sought to dispel unwarranted fears by getting to the
bottom of the matter through honest inquiry of subordinates. In an 18 March 1945 letter,
Eisenhower addressed two of his field commanders, Major Generals Maurice Rose and Isaac
White, commanders of the 3rd and 2nd Armored Divisions respectively, seeking feedback from
the fighting men in their commands regarding the quality of American tanks in comparison with
those of the Germans (sadly, Rose would be killed less than two weeks later on 30 March, being
the highest ranking American killed by enemy fire in the ETO). 124
On a secondary level, Eisenhower also sought comparisons on other items of equipment,
as well as requesting comment on the new T26. He got little in the way of response back
concerning the latter despite ten T26E3s being recently employed by the 3rd Armored in the
action in and around Cologne, Germany. Further explanation of these tanks in action is described
below. In the letter, Eisenhower first conveyed his impressions of the armor situation in Europe
gleaned through casual conversation:
Our men, in general, realize that the Sherman is not capable of standing up in a
ding-dong, head-on fight with a Panther. Neither in gun power nor in armor is the
present Sherman justified in undertaking such a contest. On the other hand, most
of them realize that we have got a job of shipping tanks overseas and therefore do
not want unwieldy monsters; that our tank has great reliability, good mobility, and
that the gun in it has been vastly improved. Most of them feel also that they have
developed tactics that allow them to employ their superior numbers to defeat the
Panther tank as long as they are not surprised and can discover the Panther before
it has gotten in three or four good shots. I think that most of them know also that
we have improved models coming out which even in head-on action are not
helpless in front of the Panther and the Tiger.125
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White responded to Eisenhower’s request with a collection of letters from subordinate
commanders and noncommissioned officers within his command attesting to the
insufficiency/sufficiency of American equipment in frontline use, particularly tanks, in
comparison to their German counterparts.126 White began his own response to Eisenhower by
summarizing the general views of the men under his command. White first cited a lack of the
latest version of the Sherman, the M4A3E8, known as the “easy eight,”--- with only two seeing
combat during Operation “Grenade” (crossing of the Roer River into Germany by the Ninth
Army).127 The M4A3E8 (or M4A3(76)W HVSS) had the new 76-mm gun mounted in a revised
turret, improved full cast armor, wet stowage for ammunition, and the improved Horizontal
Volute Suspension System (HVSS), as well as wider tracks for increased flotation. He also
pointed out that only 29 percent of his Shermans were equipped with the 76-mm gun.
White used the letter as an opportunity to beg Eisenhower for more high velocity armor
piercing ammunition (HVAP), as those few 76-mm tanks that he had had been given only four
rounds each of HVAP, and the expended rounds were not soon replaced. The HVAP ammunition
represented a concerted effort to increase the effectiveness of the 76-mm gun after the landings
at Normandy, where the standard M62A1 armor piecing shell proved incapable of penetrating
the Panther’s front glacis at any range. However, it could consistently penetrate the Panther’s
gun mantle at 230 meters or less, a decided disadvantage, especially in the thick hedgerows
where flanking German tanks was very difficult.128 The new ammunition, which began to arrive
in August 1944, however, remained scarce due to a limited availability of tungsten carbide.129
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In 1944, the United States had a munitions production need of thirty million tons of
tungsten, but could only produce half of that amount.130 The T4 HVAP projectile used a subcaliber tungsten penetrator in combination with powerful new propellant. It could penetrate 208
mms of armor at 500 meters, adequate for the 145 mm effective thickness of the Panther’s glacis
plate.131 As White mentions, “However, the 76-mm gun, even with HVAP ammunition, is not
effective at the required ranges at which we must be able to effectively engage enemy armor.”132
One of White’s subordinates, Colonel S. R. Hinds, Commander of Combat Command
“B”, also had an insightful opinion on the unbalanced armor situation:
Mechanically our tanks are at least the equal of any German tank and on good,
firm terrain or on roads are more mobile…In my opinion, the reason our armor
has engaged the German tanks as successfully as it has is not due by any means to
a superior tank but to our superior numbers of tanks on the battlefield and the
willingness of our tankers to take their losses while maneuvering to a position
from which a penetrating shot can be put through a weak spot of the enemy
tank…The new tanks now being received [likely referring to M4A3 variants] are
a far step in the proper direction but still do not possess the gun power necessary
to penetrate the German tank for a crippling shot on the first hit. In spite of the
often quoted tactical rule that one should not fight a tank versus tank battle, I have
found it necessary, almost invariably, in order to accomplish the mission.133
Similarly, Colonel Paul A. Disney, Commander of the 67th Armored Regiment, after gathering a
digest of opinions from tankers in his command, remarked that: “…in general the M4 with 75mm and 76-mm gun is definitely inferior to enemy tanks. This opinion is based on many
instances in which our tanks have engaged enemy tanks only to observe rounds ricochet off
them, and in many cases to have been hit themselves by the same enemy tanks and destroyed.”134
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Disney also highlighted that the Panther enjoyed a distinct advantage over the Sherman with
regards to turning radius, speed of turn, and mobility in muddy terrain.
The American tankers on the ground understood and responded to the realities of the
armor gap situation better than any, and as such, their observations were saturated with a sense of
urgency, and yet arguably provide the most clarity. Sgt. Rains M. Robbins, a 3rd Armored
Division tank commander, and his driver, Cpl. Walter McGrail, had landed in France with the
division and shared their assessment:
… we’ve seen countless numbers of American tanks knocked out and burned with
resultant high loss of American lives, due, we believe, to our inferior tanks.
Of course, we must take into consideration the fact that, due to the nature
and course of the war, the German tank usually gets in the first shot. Instead of
making up this disadvantage in equipping us with guns of high muzzle velocity
and hitting power, in addition to more armor protection, as matters stand now we
can’t compete with them in either. To take a specific case, the German Mark V
tank, mounting a 75mm gun with a muzzle velocity of about 3200 feet per second,
able to travel on a highway at 38 miles per hour, 15 to 20 miles per hour crosscountry in soft going…135
The two tankers went on to relay telling details from their combat experiences, describing a very
real gap in effective engagement ranges: “…one of our medium tanks was hit and burned at a
range of approximately 2500 yards…minutes later, we fired on and bounced several rounds of
AP broadside off a Jerry tank at a range of 1500 yards, and were unable to knock it out.” They
also reported that their 76-mm gun could not deal with a Panther’s front armor at 600 yards.136
The men concluded: “The consensus of opinion is that the German Mark V can outspeed,
outmaneuver and outgun us, in addition to their added protection of heavier armor.137
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Another junior NCO, Cpl. Clarence E. Land, a tank driver and gunner, reiterated: “I have
seen our 75-mm and 76-mm AP bounce off of German Mark V and Mark VI tanks. I have seen
German AP shells go through our M4 tank turrets. I haven’t seen a German tank knocked out,
that was hit in the front; you always have to hit them in the side or rear compartment.”138 Clearly,
there was a need for a better tank in the ETO.
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Chapter 2 - The M26 in Action in World War II
The T26E3 had its combat debut in the latter months of the Second World War, too late
to have any real effect on the outcome, and too late to gain a thorough assessment of its combat
value. However, it did prove to be a capable design, one that could effectively deal with both the
German Panther and Tiger, while not clearly superior to either. This chapter focuses on the first
twenty T26E3s of the “Zebra Project” shipped to the ETO, specifically the 3rd Armored
Division’s Pershings in the fighting in and around Cologne, Germany and the Pershings of Task
Force Engeman, of the 9th Armored Division, in the all-important capture of the Ludendorf
Bridge at Remagen, Germany. Though later shipments of the T26E3 (M26, after its
standardization in March) arrived in theater, only limited combat records exist and all available
sources point to these tanks only seeing minor action. A noteworthy limitation to their
employment was that, being much wider than the M4 and ten tons heavier when combat loaded,
all the T26E3s in the ETO were greatly restricted by both the European bridge network as well
as the Army’s own system of Bailey Bridges. Following victory in Europe, a handful of M26s
were rushed to the Pacific, specifically Okinawa, but these arrived after hostilities on the island
had ceased. The M26 was anticipated to be used during the invasion of the Japanese mainland,
but the end of the war in August 1945 ended this mission.
In the late fall of 1944, Barnes suggested that twenty of the first forty T26E3s produced
in the Fisher Tank Arsenal in November 1944 be sent immediately to the European Theater of
Operations, while the remaining twenty Pershings be sent to Fort Knox, Kentucky for tests
conducted by the Armored Board. 1 The AGF objected to Barnes’ plan, instead insisting that all
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forty of the tanks be sent for testing and approval by the Armored Board. Barnes threatened to go
to General Marshall but instead found immediate support from Major General Russell Maxwell,
the Assistant Chief of Staff.2 As a result, twenty T26E3s, Serial No. 22 through 41, were shipped
to Antwerp, Belgium, arriving in January 1945.
Barnes personally led the project, codenamed Zebra, to expedite getting the new tanks, as
well as several other new weapons, into action. However, Barnes and his accompanying team of
experts would not arrive in Paris until 9 February.3 A meeting with General Eisenhower
confirmed that the T26E3s would be brought to the fight as soon as possible. The tanks were
assigned to General Omar Bradley’s 12th Army Group, and all twenty went to Lieutenant
General Courtney Hodges’s First Army. They were then divided with ten tanks each being sent
to both the 3rd and 9th Armored Divisions. The two divisions had been previously brought in
reserve to recover from the heavy losses sustained in December during the Battle of the Bulge.4
One of Barnes’s team members, Captain Elmer Gray from the Tank Automotive Command, was
given the lead for the T26 portion of the Zebra project. He and other team members headed for
Antwerp on 11 February.5
Before Gray’s arrival, German V-1 “buzz bombs” targeted Antwerp heavily so the tanks
were loaded on and around 9 February on M25 tank transporters, modified to handle the
additional weight and width of the T26E3s, and sent twenty-eight miles south to Brussels. After
also traveling to Brussels, Captain Gray was turned around and sent to meet up with General
Barnes and Colonel Joseph Colby, also from the Tank Automotive Command, at General
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Hodges’ First Army Headquarters at Spa, France.6 Here he received orders to move the tanks to
Aachen, Germany, which lay right along the German border with Belgium and the Netherlands.
On the morning of 17 February, Gray led the convoy the ninety miles east to Aachen.
Once at Aachen, soldiers of the 559th Heavy Maintenance Tank Company began to
prepare the T26s for combat, while Gray and company met with the ten tank crews that had been
sent from the 3rd Armored Division.7 The crews received classroom instruction from Gray on
the basic mechanics and components of the T26E3. Captain Gifford, from the Aberdeen Proving
Ground, taught the operating procedures, while L. R. (Slim) Price, a civilian expert on the 90mm main gun also from Aberdeen Proving Ground, gave classes on gunnery to tank gunners,
commanders, and loaders.8 Similarly, corresponding classes were given to the maintenance
battalion men sent from the 3rd and 9th Armored Divisions.
The 9th Armored Division tank crews soon arrived and received their own classroom
instruction as the 3rd Armored Division men finished up on 20 February.9 After the Pershings
had been certified mechanically, the last step for the tankers was to boresight their guns and get a
few rounds of trigger time. Also, on 20 February, Price sent the tankers to a range, where each
crew was allotted 28 rounds for familiarization. Price defended the accuracy of the 90-mm M3
gun but harped upon the importance of a proper boresight to ensure its effectiveness. He also
instructed the tankers to target a specific spot on the target rather than the whole thing. After
nineteen of the twenty tank crews had failed to meet his high standards for boresighting, Price
conducted a live fire demonstration to reaffirm the effectiveness of his methods, successfully
hitting designated spots on target vehicles.
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At a later date, to demonstrate his same point to some of Patton’s tank crews in the 11th
Armored Division, he used German helmets as targets and pegged them across a lake with single
shots from the 90-mm gun from 625 meters.10 Upon seeing this, any of the veteran tankers who
may have balked at receiving instruction from a civilian were suddenly all right with the idea.
Not to be outdone, however, the tankers soon duplicated his marksmanship as they grew
accustomed to the weapon and got the “feel” of it.11 On 23 February, the crews finished
boresighting and test firing of the tanks. Each division then incorporated the T26s into their
organization, but in different ways. The 3rd Armored Division had two armored regiments, the
32nd and 33rd, and each of these regiments received five T26s. In hopes of embedding available
heavy tank support with the most units possible, the 32nd Armored Regiment had a single T26
assigned to D, E, G, H, and I Companies, respectively, and similarly, the 33rd Armored
Regiment had a single T26 assigned to D, E, F, H, and I Companies.12
The 9th Armored Division, which was divided into three tank battalions rather than two
armored regiments, in contrast, tried a slightly different approach with the allocation of its ten
T26s. Its 19th Tank Battalion received five tanks, assigning one T26 to A Company and two
each to its B and C Companies. The 14th Tank Battalion, however, had all five of its T26s
assigned to a single platoon in its A Company, commanded by Lieutenant John Grimball. For
reference, each American tank company had three tank platoons with five tanks each, one tank in
each platoon being for the platoon leader. The headquarters platoon of each company had two
more tanks, one for the commander and company first sergeant. Additionally, the HQ platoon
had one 105mm assault tank, or M7 Priest (self-propelled artillery) if an M4 was unavailable, for
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organic artillery support. In total, an American tank company had eighteen tanks/assault tanks.13)
The men and tanks of the 3rd Armored Division went into battle on 25 February, and the 9th
Armored on the 28th of the month. Captain Gray and his team established themselves with the
3rd Armored’s maintenance battalion at Düren, Germany, which lay twenty miles further east on
the east bank of the Roer River. From there they followed the tanks into action, supervising
repairs as necessary, and making reports of the T26E3s performance.14
3rd Armored Division’s T26s crossed the Roer on 25 February, along with the rest of the
division and were the first Zebra project Pershings to see action. On the night of 26 February, at
Elsdorf, Germany (by road, twenty miles northeast of Düren and twenty-two miles west of the
major west central German city of Cologne), the first T26, named “fireball” from F Company,
33rd Armored Regiment, was knocked out of action. The tank had been given the task of
overwatching a roadblock. Though it sat behind the roadblock with only its turret exposed, its
overall position was not well considered. Surrounding fires allowed its turret to be silhouetted in
the night sky. Hidden behind a building a 100 meters away, a Tiger I fired three shots at the tank
with its 8.8 cm gun. The first shot entered the turret through the coaxial machine gun port, killing
the gunner and loader. The next struck the end of the T26E3’s gun splitting the muzzle brake and
jarring the gun so that the shell in the chamber exploded. The exploded round managed to expel
its charge down the barrel but not before the irregular explosion caused the barrel to swell at its
halfway point. The third and final round fired glanced off the upper-right of the turret and ripped
the commander’s cupola hatch, that had been left open, away with it. After firing, the Tiger I
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attempted to withdraw from the area but immobilized itself on a pile of rubble behind it as it
backed up.15
“Fireball” was brought back to Düren by Captain Gray where it was quickly repaired and
returned to service on 7 March. Due to an unavailability of replacement M3 gun barrels, a 90mm gun from an M36 tank destroyer was used instead. Back at Elsdorf, a T26 from a sister
company, E Company, 33rd Armored Regiment (Serial No. 40), avenged the loss of “Fireball”
the following day, 27 February. Zaloga succinctly sums up the action:
The next day, a T26E3 of Co. E, 33rd Armored Regiment knocked out a
Tiger I and two PzKpfw IV tanks from the 9.Pz.Div. near Elsdorf. The Tiger was
hit at a range of about 900 yards with a round of the new T30E16 HVAP,
followed by a round of normal T33 armor piercing, which entered the turret and
set off an internal explosion. The two PzKpfw IVs were knocked out at the
impressive range of 1,200 yards, beyond the normal engagement ranges for US
tanks in World War II.16
The T26 used one round each of T33 to dispatch the PzKpfw IVs or Mark IVs. Two additional
high explosive shells were used to eliminate the enemy crew members as they fled their
vehicles.17 This same tank crew would later take out another Mark IV during the drive to
Cologne.
3rd Division’s T26s would see an increase in combat and noncombat incidents as the
division pushed towards the Rhine. The T26E3 assigned to Company I, 33rd Armored Regiment
suffered an engine failure, and two other undisclosed Pershings had to be recovered as well. One
from engine failure, and the other found halfway on and halfway off a bridge over the Erft
Canal.18 During the fighting for Cologne on 6 March, H Company, 33rd Armored Regiment’s
T26 was knocked out. Because of the fighting in the city, Captain Gray was unable to recover the
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tank until the next day, 7 March, where it was found on the north side of Cologne, near the Rhine
River. The tank had been destroyed by a single shell from an 8.8 cm self-propelled gun from a
range of under 300 meters. The impacting round went through the lower plate of the frontal
armor, between the legs of the driver, and into crew compartment where it set the turret on fire.
All of the Pershing’s crew were able to escape unharmed, however, before the stowed rounds in
the turret ignited and destroyed the tank. Rather than repair it, which would have taken several
months, Gray elected to have the vehicle sent to the rear for cannibalization of its much-needed
spare parts.19 This tank, Serial No. 25, was the only Pershing involved in any sort of combat to
not survive the war.20
The Pershings of the 32nd Armored Regiment would perform well during the 6 March
fight for Cologne, as well during the concurrent drives for other regimental objectives along the
Rhine, with three of the five tanks assigned each knocking out German tanks. Company D’s T26,
Serial No. 36, knocked out a Tiger I with two rounds of T33 ammunition, and Company G’s,
Serial No. 33, took out a Mark IV at Manheim (another city on the Rhine 50 miles southeast of
Cologne) with three rounds of M82 APC (armor-piercing-capped).21 As a side note, the M82
APC rounds had a temperature hardened outer cap designed to defeat the hardened outer layer of
enemy armor. Underneath the outer cap was a relatively soft core of armor designed to spread
out the point of impact to an area the size of the head of the round. This allowed the force of the
projectile beneath the soft core to be evenly distributed, reducing the risk of the projectile’s sharp
tip sheering off.22 Company E’s T26, Serial No. 26, commanded by Sergeant Robert Early would
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make one of the most famous tank kills of the war, largely because the encounter was captured
on film.
Early’s tank knocked out a Panther (Mark V) tank that was parked in the courtyard in
front of the Cologne Cathedral minutes after it had just destroyed a Sherman. Two of the
Sherman’s crewmen escaped the vehicle, one from the turret missing a leg.23 The Pershing was
called up and soon fired a first round at the Panther through a building, collapsing the building
but having no effect on the parked German tank. Early then moved his tank further down the
street where he got into a flanking position and fired three shots in quick succession. Early’s
gunner, Cpl. Clarence Smoyer, fired the first shot on the move, with T33 ammunition, scoring a
hit on the base of the turret to the left of the gun tube.24 The second round penetrated the right
sponson, and the third struck and penetrated the right hull front.
A 16-mm film of the Panther’s destruction was captured by Sgt. Jim Bates, a First Army
Signal Corps photographer who had been attached to the 3rd Armored Division.25 He captured
the film while on a mezzanine overlooking the German tank only 100 meters away. After
showing the first round impacting and igniting the tank, his film reveals the tank commander roll
out of the turret and onto the front deck, his legs severed. With only adrenaline perhaps keeping
him alive, the tank commander flipped himself onto the ground on the noncombat side of the
vehicle and briefly out of sight. Another crew member, presumably either the radio operator or
driver, fled from the stricken vehicle, pausing only for a second to assist the tank commander as
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he crawled away from the now burning tank. The crewman ran behind a nearby corner of a
building while the tank commander lay motionless. No other crewmembers emerged as the tank
was impacted two more times by 90-mm shells; flames poured from the commander’s cupola.
According to Smoyer:
We were told to just move into the intersection far enough to fire into the
side of the enemy tank, which had their gun facing up the other street. However,
as we entered the intersection, our driver had his periscope turned toward the
Germans and saw their gun turning to meet us. When I turned our turret, I was
looking into the Mark V gun tube; so instead of stopping to fire, our driver drove
into the middle of the intersection so we wouldn't be a sitting target. As we were
moving, I fired once. Then we stopped and I fired two more shells to make sure
they wouldn't fire at our side. All three of our shells penetrated, one under the gun
shield and two on the side. The two side hits went completely through and out the
other side.
As for the German tank crew, I spent many years wondering if they survived.
Only recently, after receiving the Bates' tape, did I find the answer. The tape
revealed that three died outside of the tank. A letter from another soldier who
looked through one of the shell holes said he saw one burned to death inside the
tank. Apparently none of them survived the ordeal. The M 26 Perishing Tank with
the 90 mm gun was the best tank we had during the war. We kept it till the end of
the war; however, we were hit twice with panzerfausts at Paderborn and had to
have repairs done.26
Lieutenant Grimball’s platoon of five T26s, Serial No. 22, 27, 28, 35, and 39, part of A
Company, 14th Tank Battalion, crossed the Roer River on 28 February along with the rest of the
9th Armored Division.27 Almost immediately, No. 27 threw a piston and had to be recovered for
repairs. It would be back in service on 5 March, however.28 On the night of 1 March, No. 22 was
struck by an estimated 15cm high explosive shell as it sat parked near a road junction to the east
of the Roer.29 It impacted near the rear sprocket, mangling the tank’s tracks and setting the
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engine compartment on fire. The tank commander, Platoon Sergeant Chester Key, had his crew
dismount and was fighting the fire when a second high explosive shell impacted the middle of
the turret, killing him instantly.30 The turret had nearly been blow off the tank, and the
commander’s cupola was thrown 25 feet away. Despite the extensive repairs needed, No. 22 was
returned to duty on 12 March.
Throughout the drive towards the Rhine, many smaller streams had to be crossed, and the
T26s had difficulty getting over the narrow bridges that spanned them. In addition, prefabricated
Bailey Bridges, thrown up by Army Corps of Engineers, were damaged by the T26s, causing
unexpected delays for follow on forces as the bridges were repaired.31 According to Hunnicutt,
the T26 was just barely narrow enough to fit on a sixty-ton Bailey Bridge and needed to drive
over large timbers to keep the bridge’s curbs from being damaged. He gives photographic
evidence of just such a crossing being made by a T26E1 during stateside testing.32 The U.S.
Army Field Manual on the Bailey Bridge, FM 5-277, makes the matter a little less clear,
however. A diagram depicting a normal M2 Bridge, in a single double (refers to the tress layout)
single lane bridge configuration, gives the standard allotted roadway portion as being 12 feet 6
inches (150 inches) wide, more than enough space to accommodate the T26E3’s 11 foot 6 inch
(138 inch) tread width, notwithstanding the total clearance between the trusses on the bridge
given at 14 feet 3 inches (171 inches). 33 Captain Cecil Roberts, an operations officer with the
14th Tank Battalion, mentioned the Pershing tanks of his unit getting folded in to their sister
company, the 19th Tank Battalion, in exchange for M4A3 Shermans because: “…the M26 tracks
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were so wide they could not cross obstacles on the U.S. Army Treadway bridging.”34 Regardless,
the T26s were held back to allow other elements to cross first, keeping them well away from
frontline combat.
On 7 March the last of these minor obstacles were largely behind them and the chain of
command ushered Grimball’s platoon to the frontline for the final push on Remagen, which was
thirty miles southeast of Cologne and on the west bank of the Rhine. Remagen was known to
have had a major crossing, the Ludendorf Railroad Bridge. American forces hoped to capture the
bridge but did not believe it would still be standing. American bombers had destroyed many of
the bridges and the Germans were destroying the rest to prevent the Allies from crossing the
Rhine. The Hohenzollern Bridge in Cologne, for example, had been blown just ahead of
advancing American troops.35
Grimball’s platoon was part of Task Force Engeman, named for its commander
Lieutenant Colonel Leonard Engeman, which in turn was part of Combat Command B,
commanded by Brigadier General William Hoge.36 Task Force Engeman was the northern
column of Combat Command B during the drive on Remagen.37 Prior to departure from the town
of Stadt Meckenheim, approximately ten miles north by northwest of Remagen, Engeman
arranged the order of movement of his combined elements as follows: he ordered a platoon from
C Co., 89th Cav. Reconnaissance Squadron (mechanized), to scout out the route ahead and
screen the advancing convoy’s left flank; one platoon from A Co., 27th Armored Infantry Bn., in
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M3 half-tracks; Lt. Grimball’s platoon of T26s from A Co., 14th Tank Bn. (minus one Pershing;
Serial No. 22 was still undergoing repairs from the high explosive shell damage); the balance of
A Co., 27th Armored Inf. Bn.; one platoon of B Co., 9th Armd Engr. Bn.; C Co., 27th Armd Inf.
Bn.; and the remaining tanks (all Shermans) of A Co., 14th Tk. Bn.38
The morning of 7 March, General William Hoge asked LTC Engeman how fast he
wished to go, and after he replied “10 mile per hour,” the general ensured that none of Combat
Command B’s rate of march exceeded that mark. At 0900, the column left Stadt Meckenheim,
where they had spent the previous night.39 The task force then advanced along the road that went
through Birresdorf, five miles to the west of Remagen, and received sporadic small arms fire,
“light artillery,” and “a little AAA fire” as they went.40 At noon, Hoge assigned Engeman’s task
force with the task of taking Remagen and Kripp, another town along the Rhine two miles
southeast of Remagen, also known to have had a bridge, and kept the rest of Combat Command
B following in reserve.41 In the early afternoon, LTC Engeman dismounted and walked out on
the high ground near a small cathedral at Apollinarisberg (Apollinarskirche) overlooking
Remagen to the southeast, as well as much of the Rhine.
Peering through his field glasses, he immediately saw below what every American field
commander in the ETO had been yearning to see, an intact bridge crossing the Rhine River. Only
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one mile away, Engeman saw German troops, vehicles, and civilians, all mixed together,
retreating toward the far side. He did not observe any enemy armor.42 Interestingly, Engeman’s
first inclination was to call in an artillery strike on the bridge. “I wanted some time fire placed on
the bridge….” The request for artillery was denied because the near proximity of friendly
troops.43 From there, Engeman “…smelled that they wanted to take the bridge intact.”
He quickly called a council of war with Lt. Grimball and the CO of A Company, 27th
Armored Infantry Bn., Lt. Carl Timmerman. As Engeman spoke with the young officers, two
enemy locomotives on the far side of the river were producing clouds of steam. Lt. Grimball said
he would take care of that “little detail”.44 It would not be Grimball, however, but one of his
tankers, Sgt. Howard Shaffer, who would destroy one of the locomotives as it fled (mentioned
below). Engeman ordered A Company to dismount, move down the hill, and occupy the town,
sweeping toward the bridge. He considered leaving the infantry mounted in the halftracks and
making a mounted dash, but decided against the move not knowing what the Germans had in the
town. With Grimball’s platoon of T26s, however, he was more cavalier: “…barrel down the hill
and go through the town and cover the bridge with tank fire, and if anybody attempted to
demolish the bridge … liquidate them.”45
There was some enemy machine gun fire as the Americans moved out and moved into
the town. Grimball’s tanks “barreled” down the road only to be abruptly stopped by a large crater
at the bottom of the hill. “Never mind the crater, get going toward the bridge,” Engeman
radioed.46 When Timmerman’s infantry came under machine gun fire in the town square, two of
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Grimball’s T26s quickly eliminated the threat with their 90-mms.47 Around 1500 hours, the
tankers and infantryman reached the vicinity of the bridge. All the enemy foot and vehicle traffic
had already made its way across the span. Grimball employed his tanks in a blocking position
near the bridge, placing one tank on the approach road covering the railway track and the other
three were lined along the road engaging targets on the East bank.48 Timmerman’s infantryman
advanced towards the bridge approach but were driven back by enemy gun fire. While the
infantry regrouped, the T26s accurately engaged enemy positions across the river as they
appeared with both .30 caliber machine gun and 90-mm fire.49
At 1550, the enemy set off a pre-emplaced demolition charge creating a large crater,
approximately 15 feet wide and 10 feet deep, on the near-side approach to the bridge, preventing
any armor from attempting to cross.50 Several minutes later, the Germans detonated another set
of pre-planted charges on the bridge.51 The bridge was damaged but, amazingly, still left
passable for infantry. In the smoky haze, it was unclear whether the bridge was stable enough to
cross, or whether additional charges had been set. Timmerman’s infantry soon bravely began
crossing the Ludendorff span. However, the soldiers of the company were initially hesitant to
leave their positions; Timmerman stood exposed on the approach to the bridge, trying to rally his
men to advance. Movement finally began when, Sergeant Anthony Samele, of 1st Platoon, A
Company, the first unit to cross, encouraged his platoon leader, Sergeant Michael Chinchar:
“C’mon, Mike, we’ll just walk it over.”52
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Colonel Engeman had his attached tank destroyers and 105mm assault guns lined up on
the high ground at Apollinaris Church, near the step off point for the advance on the town, and
fire white phosphorous shells. When combined with additional mortar fire from the 27th Armored
Infantry Battalion, a thick smoke screen was established on the far bank.53 Despite the screen,
enemy machine gun, indirect, high-velocity, and sniper fire began in earnest. Some enemy 20mm
fire came from high ground to the south on the near side of the river, and a detachment from D
Company, 14th Tank Bn., was sent to deal with it. Grimball’s tank eliminated an enemy machine
gun emplacement on one of the bridge’s far side towers with a 90-mm round. The enemy
machine gun fire immediately slackened.54 A differing account has the tank engaging the tower
to remove a sniper threat.55
Around 1500, the enemy locomotive mentioned earlier, trailing many flatcars and some
boxcars, was attempting to flee the area south and just got underway when a 90-mm round from
Shaffer’s T26 immobilized it, approximately 700 meters south of the bridge.56 Meanwhile, a
Sherman equipped with a dozer blade came forward to fill the crater on the bridge’s western
approach. The crater, however, was covered by German fire from small arms and two 40-mm
flak guns.57 The tanks soon eliminated the flak positions and the dozer was able to move in and
start his work. Soon after, a sniper began firing on the dozer from a half-submerged barge in the
Rhine.58 Quickly identified, the sniper was soon eliminated by infantry on the bridge as well as a
Sherman’s 75-mm gun as he belatedly attempted to raise a white flag.59
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LTC Engeman ordered Lt. Eugene Mott, B Co., 9th Armd Engr. Bn., to check the
demolition charges remaining on the bridge. Even as infantrymen still moved across, Mott swept
the bridge for explosives, finding unexploded TNT whose initiators had detonated but failed to
ignite their main charges. At dusk, the crater was filled in and the bridge was made sound
enough for vehicles, but it would not be until 2200 when tanks would be ordered to cross. After
unexplained delays with anti-tank guns that were supposed to cross ahead of the tanks, a column
of nine Shermans from A Company, 14th Tank Battalion moved ahead in line and began to cross
the bridge shortly after midnight on 8 March.60 The 8 x 8 beams that had been used to repair a
section of the decking on the bridge, creaked ominously under the thirty-six ton Shermans as
they passed.61 These tanks would be the first Allied tanks on the east bank of the Rhine. The
American commanders determined the Pershings at 46 tons were too heavy to risk passage.62
Being held back again, Grimball’s platoon was ferried across the Rhine on barges five
days later, 12 March.63 His men and tanks had played an instrumental part in the Battle of
Remagen though. At the pivotal moment, they helped secure the near side of a valuable tactical
objective and facilitated the crossing to and securing of the far side, turning a tactical victory into
an operational breakthrough. They had performed admirably. In short, the capture of the
Ludendorff Bridge and the subsequent beachhead opened the Allied way into the heartland of
Germany. The troops of the First Army received fitting praise in a letter from the top:
The whole Allied force is delighted to cheer the U.S. First Army whose
speed and boldness have won the race to establish our first bridgehead over the
Rhine. Please tell all ranks how proud I am.
Eisenhower
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To the men of the First Army who won this race I extend my
congratulations. I share the pride of the Supreme Commander in your fine
achievement.
Lieutenant General Courtney Hodges
Commander, First Army64
The original twenty Pershings continued to fight on with their parent organizations, the
3rd and 9th Armored Divisions, through March, April, and into May 1945. But to what extent the
tanks were employed remains in large part a mystery. As mentioned above, Grimball’s five
Pershings of the 14th Tank Battalion were transferred to the 19th Tank Battalion in exchange for
Shermans in early April.65 The move is telling of the combat situation faced by the tankers this
late in the war, one indicative of a lack of enemy armor threat and where not slowing the rate of
advance counted more than increased tank fighting ability.66 The American rate of advance was
so fast that most of the after-action reports that followed lack detail. The following excerpt from
a 14th Tk. Bn., 9th Armored Division after action report describes the unit’s last twenty-four
hours of combat. It illustrates some sense of the breakneck pace of events.
Under radio silence, the battalion moved out at 060800 May 1945. A
approximately 0950 hours the 14th Tank Battalion moved into Czechoslovakia.
East of Cheb…Czechoslovakia, the force passed thru the lines of the 1st Infantry
Division for Karlsbad, Czechoslovakia, First resistance was met at Kornov…. At
this point, finding that the leading reconnaissance elements were too thinly
armored, Company A took the lead until one platoon of Company D could pass
thru the column and continue the attack.
For the remainder of the day all movement was slow due to the numerous
obstacles encountered. Bazooka and burp gun fire halted the column at P-400780.
The infantry dismounted and rounded up the enemy. A mile and a half down the
road a battery of five 88’s knocked out a light tank before they could be silenced.
Near Steinhof (P-481780) and Goldorf (P-451791) more road blocks were
encountered. Fire from the woods beyond Goldorf knocked out a second light
tank. Here again the infantry dismounted, flanked the wooded sector, and cleaned
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out the woods and supporting positions. Another two 88’s were knocked out by
the lead elements.
Finally, after disposing of four more road-blocks, the column closed at [ineligible
name of a town] (P-485815), Czechoslovakia. The time was 2145 hours, and the
total distance traveled was 24.7 miles. The towns passed thru were: Mitternich (P233599) and [ineligible name of town] (P-271660) Germany, Cheb (P-315746),
Kornov (P-384770), Kulsam (P-393776), [ineligible]teinhof (P-431780), Goldorf
(P-451789), and [ineligible name of town] (P-485815) Czechoslovakia….
At 070615 May 1945, the 14th Tank Battalion moved out to continue the attack of
the 1st Infantry Division. By 0700 hours the column was in [ineligible]alknov (P500476) heading toward [ineligible] (Locket) (P-580033). No resistance was
being met. At 0945 hours an order was received from Combat Command A, 9th
Armored Division to cease all forward movement, take local security measures
and await further instructions. The last shot fired by the 14th Tank Battalion was
at 070925 May 1945. Lead elements had advanced into Czechoslovakia to a point
approximately half way between [illegible name of town] and Karlsbad….67
If ammunition expenditure lists reveal anything, then between five and seven hundred 90mm rounds were expended by the 9th Armored Division during combat operations in March,
though it should be admitted that during that month, 75 percent of the total ammunition
expended was used in the first ten days.68 Regardless, even if the lower figure is consulted, the
number of rounds fired in anger is still substantial by any measure. However, it should also be
taken into account that the M36 tank destroyers also fired the same 90-mm rounds; just how
many remains unclear, however, as the 9th Armored Division did not have an organic tank
destroyer battalion.69 The reports that exist are somewhat ambiguous in another way as well.
They make clear mention of every German tank destroyed or captured by various units as they
advanced, being careful to identify them as “Mark IV” (PzKpfw IV), “Mark V” or “Panther”
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(PzKpfw V), “Mark VI” or “Tiger” (PzKpfw VI), or “Tiger Royal” (Sd. Kfz. 182), but the same
reports almost exclusively refer to friendly armor only as “tank.”
Lt. Grimball’s platoon and the other fifteen T26s of the Zebra project were not the only
Pershings to be sent to the ETO. They would, however, be the only American heavy tanks (T26s)
to see extensive combat. On 8 March 1945, Barnes visited the Supreme Headquarters Allied
Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) at Rheims, Germany, where he showed Eisenhower some
sketches, presumably for the T26E3. The same day, Eisenhower cabled General Brehon B.
Somervell, Commander AGF, requesting immediate shipment of any available T26 tanks.
Combat operations to date, while limited, convince me that the T-26 tank has
what it takes. Barnes thinks you may have some 200 available for shipment now.
Urge strongly that you get every tank this type to us as quick as possible
displacing M-4s or other types as necessary to find requisite tonnage. Would
appreciate immediate advice as to what you can do so we can arrange assignment
and get maximum number into current action at earliest possible date.70
At the end of March, a second group of forty M26s (the T26E3 had been standardized as the
M26 in March) arrived at Antwerp and then a group of thirty more followed in April. The second
group was sent to the Ninth Army, with twenty-two tanks going to the 2nd Armored Division
and eighteen going to the 5th.71 The thirty tanks that arrived in the third delivery went to the 11th
Armored Division of Patton’s Third Army.72 These tanks did see limited action, but few records
exist to support a narrative of such. In total, 310 Pershings would be brought to the ETO by
war’s end, but only the ninety already described saw action.73 There was one exception,
however.

70
Dwight D. Eisenhower to Brehon B. Somervell, Cable F 17649, March 8, 1945, letter, quoted in Dwight
D Eisenhower, The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, The War Years: IV, ed. Alfred D. Chandler, et al., vol. 4
(London: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), 2511, no. 2320.
71
Zaloga, M26/46 Pershing, 22.
72
Ibid.
73
Ibid.

59
In mid-March a solitary Pershing tank was brought to Germany that was not like the
others. The appearance of the King Tiger tank in August 1944, with its powerful 8.8cm KwK43,
caused trepidations amongst armored force commanders and created a desire for a tank that
could match it in firepower.74 Stateside, the first of the ten original T26E1 pilots was equipped
with an experimental T15E1 90-mm gun that offered comparable performance to the King
Tiger’s 8.8cm KwK43. Using a longer more cumbersome version of the new T30E16 HVAP
round, the T15E1 could penetrate 220 mm of armor sloped at thirty degrees from a distance of
900 meters.75 After its new modifications, the T26E1 used for the project was designated a
T26E4.76 The “Super Pershing,” as the modified pilot became known in the ETO, required two
large cylindrical recoil absorbers to be mounted externally on top of the turret in order for the
T15E1 gun to function properly. It was shipped to Aberdeen Proving Ground on 12 January for
proof firing, and then from there to the ETO.77 Once in Germany, more than five tons of armor
plate was welded to its frontal armor and gun mantle to make its protection comparable to the
King Tiger’s. Though the new tank would never meet its intended nemesis, it did enter combat
on 4 April along the Weser River, firing its main gun only once, yet destroying an enemy tank
(likely a Panther or Tiger) from approximately 1400 meters.78
While the war was all but won in Europe, the end was not immediately in sight in the
Pacific. The Battle for Okinawa raged and an unexpected number of Sherman tanks were being
destroyed by the Japanese 47-mm anti-tank guns.79 On 19 May, Gen. Marshall was notified that
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“Twelve of the M-26 tanks were loaded 18 May in Seattle for direct shipment to Okinawa.”80
The vehicles were originally scheduled to travel to Hawaii first, but with time quickly passing it
was recommended they be sent directly to Okinawa.81 Marshall gave his approval, simply
sprawling “Good” on the note.82
The real reason behind the mission it seems, however, was to send the M26 for combat
tests. In a Top Secret 26 May War Department memorandum it was suggested “…that
conferences be arranged between representatives of CINCAFFAC [Commander-in Chief, U.S.
Army Air Forces, Pacific], COMGEN-POA [Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces, Pacific
Ocean Areas], COMGEN’s 10th, 6th & 8th Armies, and the WD [War Department] to determine
suitability of this equipment, based on Okinawa tests.”83 ‘Suitability,’ it is presumed, meant not
only mobility performance in the austere terrain and soft ground of Okinawa, but the overall
viability of the tank for expected operations against the Japanese mainland. The memo qualified
this assumption with the remark: “No additional heavy tanks, M26 to be shipped, pending
combat tests of twelve now en route to Okinawa.”84 A similar memorandum, dated two days
earlier (24 May), elaborated: “Suitability of M26 heavy tank is questionable because of its
weight and width. Terrain features and restricted communications nets in DIABOLIC, as well as
difficulties in handling shipment and over-land movement must be considered.” The same memo
also accurately predicted: “It appears doubtful that shipments from US or by direct redeployment
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would arrive for use in ICEBERG [Okinawa].”85 The tanks were rushed to the battle, only to
land on 31 July 1945 after hostilities had ended.86
Even before the twelve M26s had landed on Okinawa, the planned invasion of Japan,
code named Downfall, was fast becoming a reality, and several battalions of Pershings were
being formed. CINCAFPAC (Commander-in Chief, U.S. Army Forces in the Pacific), General
Douglas MacArthur, requested fifty-four M26s to equip the 767th Tank Battalion staging in
Hawaii, and seventy-one M26s to equip the 706th Tank Battalion staging at Luzon.87
Interestingly, his request mentioned that, “The M-26 heavy tank and the M-24 light tank
[mentioned below] are the preferred items of equipment for the Pacific and procurement is based
on this fact.”88 Amidst debate, massive orders of new experimental heavy tanks, the T29 and T30
(essentially the same vehicle but mounting a 105mm and 155mm gun, respectively) were placed
even though they were still in development. As of 25 April 1945, 1,152 T29s and 504 T30s were
under order.89
General Somervell had recommended a reduced number (125 T29s and 100 T30s) with
the belief that they would arrive to the war too late.90 Deputy Chief of Staff, General Thomas T.
Handy, disagreed, and instead recommended to Somervell to not make the same mistakes made
with the T20 series:
A lengthy conservative process of testing and estimating before deciding upon
quantity production resulted in the T26 tank arriving in the theater of operations
too few and too late. Implementation of the Heavy Tank Program without further
delay is necessary to permit the maximum number of the most effective ground
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weapons being in the hands of troops at the earliest possible time…. A decision
now to produce 1152 T29 and 504 T30 tanks, the number necessary to equip
certain units and to insure an operating reserve, will, it is estimated, save between
six months and a year.91
The Commander of AGF, General Joseph Stilwell, agreed with Handy and did not want the
simultaneous production of M26s to be interfered with.92 Ultimately, 3,559 M26s were
scheduled for production in 1945 and 2,251 for 1946.93 President Truman’s decision to drop
atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki brought the war to a sudden close, however, with the
Empire of Japan’s surrender on 2 September. Ironically enough, Handy transmitted the order for
the bombing raids from the President.94 Production of the M26 continued until October of 1945,
with a total of 2,212 units being produced.
In the years that followed, the analogy “Too little, too late,” served as a popular
assessment of the T26 tank during the Second World War and following along the same vein,
leading historians have come to a similar conclusion.95 After considering both, it is hard to come
to any different conclusion, with the exception of relying strictly on the “too late” part. As Lt.
John Grimball and every other tanker who sat in America’s only production heavy tank to be
fielded during the Second World War was reminded of when they came to a bridge, or faced off
against an enemy tank, the T26E3 was not “too little.”
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Chapter 3- The Interwar Period
The interwar years, between World War II and Korea, brought an interesting mix of
stagnation and innovation to American tank development. The stagnation came largely as a result
of the developmental budget being slashed after the conclusion of the Second World War, and
much of the innovation that did occur came as a direct result of developments begun during the
war. Many post-war developments never left the testing fields. The tests of the T26E3 in the final
months of 1944 and early 1945 showed many flaws with the new tank. Armored Board tests of
the M26 in September 1945 only reinforced these findings. Developmental progress eventually
addressed much of the M26’s problems that had surfaced, especially with the engine and
transmission, but circumstance would ensure that many M26s were fielded again in the same or
worse condition they were in at the end of World War II. Only a new interim generation, the first
of the Patton series, would see major improvements. In 1948, Cold War events reinvigorated a
flagging tank developmental program, but the Korean War interrupted the new measures and led
to further interim solutions.
In the late fall of 1944, while the first twenty T26E3s of the Zebra Project were being
shipped to Europe, the next twenty tanks off Fisher’s Grand Blanc production line, Serial No. 42
through 61, were sent to Fort Knox, Kentucky for testing by the Armored Board. The purpose of
the tests was “To determine the suitability of the Heavy Tank, T26E3, for use in armored
divisions or separate tank battalions.”1 However, a letter from AGF dated 14 December 1944
ordered seven of the T26E3s to be diverted to the Armored School for “instructing teams of
specialists for use overseas.”2 Additionally, another T26E3 was assigned to the Armored Medical
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Research Laboratory for the purpose of “…conducting tests relative to the physiological aspects
of the subject vehicle.”3 Of the remaining twelve tanks, four arrived too late to be included in the
full testing by the Armored Board, and were thus used only for components testing. The final
eight T26E3s, however, were subjected to a “400-engine-hour or 4,000-mile endurance test.”4
The Armored Board report summarized the results of the test as follows:
In 321 operating days, totals of 3310:16 engine hours and 23,122 test miles were
amassed with an overall fuel economy of .35 miles per gallon and an oil economy
of 15.2 miles per quart….All operation was conducted during the winter season
with a minimum of dust. The mileages over different types of terrain are divided
as follows: 12,282 miles highway operation and 10,840 miles extremely muddy
cross-country operation. The unusually good engine performance indicates that
reasonable engine life may be expected provided that adequate cooling of the
engine and cleaning of the engine air is obtained.”5
One of the tested tanks, given the Armored Board designator of No. 640, did not complete the
400-engine-hour test: a water leak in the cooling system had caused the engine to overheat.
Three other T26E3s were subjected to a breakdown test; No. 634 failed at 487:38 engine hours
(3,252 test miles), No. 633 at 523:16 hours (3,813 miles). “Armored Board Vehicle No. 630 was
still operating as of 2400 hours 30 March 1945, with a total of 551:37 engine hours (3684 test
miles).”6 The Armored Board prepared weekly reports for the AGF, and by 20 January 1945, the
T26E3 was recommended “…for approval as battleworthy.” However, a weakness in the
elevation gear housing was considered a “disabling defect” and a forged housing replacement
was strongly urged.7 Additionally, the final report, dated 9 May 1945, remarked on the M26’s
poor fuel economy: “The average cruising radius of 65 miles or 9.3 engine hours of operations
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obtained during tests may prove unsatisfactory or even critical. Fuel capacity should permit a
minimum of 10 hours combat operations before refueling.” It was admitted, however, that
“Extreme terrain conditions were encountered throughout the test.”8
Tests on the T26E3 at the Armored Medical Research Laboratory revealed a need for
improved ventilation of powder fumes and recommended the Rotoclone blower be upgraded
from the 400 cfm one installed to a 1,000 cfm unit.9 The bulge opening on the top center of the
glacis plate was enlarged to accommodate the new blower; the bulge was also reinforced to offer
increased ballistic protection, as prior ballistic tests had found the area to be vulnerable.10 The
recommendations were followed and production models of the M26 soon reflected the
modifications, beginning with tank numbers 550 and 235 at the Fisher and Chrysler plants
respectively.11
In September 1945, Aberdeen Proving Grounds conducted the final tests on two M26s,
serial numbers 646 and 647, with the stated purpose of determining “…the general suitability of
these production type vehicles manufactured by Chrysler Corporation for combat service.”12 The
Ordnance men ultimately concluded that: “The Heavy Tank, M26, as produced by the Chrysler
Corporation be considered suitable for combat.”13 Nonetheless, the Proving Ground tests found
numerous issues. “The fuel economy…is low…and the maximum cruising range is inadequate.”
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The average miles per gallon for the tests was appalling, at .27, and no doubt let to the
recommendation that “Further effort be made to increase the present fuel capacity.” 14 The report
also labeled the maintenance for both the T80E1 tracks and the cooling system as “excessive.”15
The following quote from the Proving Ground report, while on the technical side,
excellently explains underlying track issues with a rear-powered arrangement. It also highlights
the susceptibility of the T80E1 track to damage when thrown and, by extension, the
corresponding compounded risk the damaged track had for repeat damage.
Since the Heavy Tank, M26, is a rear drive vehicle the same tendency towards
sprocket tooth jumping exists in all forward speeds as on the M4 series medium
tanks in reverse speed. With the T81 single pin track and integrally cast center
guide, sprocket tooth jumping had very little effect on the track or the center
guide. However, with the T80E1 track, jumping of the sprocket teeth damaged the
wedges and wedge nuts and track throwing was prevalent due to the bolted type
center guide which can be sheared allowing the track to be thrown.16
The tank track showed issues on steep terrain as well: “Heavy Tank, 647, attempted to climb the
incline over the old trail across a rock strata with a slope of 55 percent. The tank was unable to
get traction on the rock and slipped its left track.” U-turns on roads also proved problematic:
“’U’ turn was made while operating at speeds varying from 5 mph to 15 mph. The test tracks
started to slide noticeably at around 10 mph and at 15 mph the tank was out of control. The
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standard T80E1 tracks slid noticeably at 12 mph and at 15 mph they slid badly at the end of the
‘U’ turn.”17
The cooling system, in particular, caused considerable headache for the Ordnance men,
requiring them to “clean transmission oil coolers and the engine compartment of oil from leaking
oil fittings or damaged hose.” Interestingly, the report showed a variance in quality between
M26s produced by different manufacturers, pointing to the tanks built at the Chrysler Tank
Arsenal in Warren, Michigan, as being inferior to one’s built at Fisher Body Tank Arsenal in
Grand Blanc, Michigan. “A summation of the man hours maintenance for the cooling group
gives a total of 254:20 man hours compared to the 58:52 man hours for a similar group of Fisher
built tanks.”18
The report attempted to quantify this startling discrepancy by asserting that “This
difference may be directly attributable to operation of the subject vehicles during a hot, dusty
season where the narrow safety margin in the Heavy Tank, M26, cooling system is quickly lost
and operating difficulties encountered.” If the latter conclusion by the Aberdeen men was the
case, then the M26 was little more than an oil sieve in the summertime. Assessments of armor in
Korea made after the summer of 1950, offer little in the way of corroborating evidence, and do
not suggest any chronic or excessive cooling issues; admittedly however, they do not deny the
issue either. Without further information, therefore, the quality of M26s based upon
manufacturer seems open to speculation.
While the Armored Board’s tests of the T26E3 were under way in early 1945, the first
T26E1 pilot that had been modified to mount the powerful T15E1 90-mm gun, was shipped to
Germany for combat tests. The “Super Pershing’s” T15E1 90-mm gun was an impressive 73
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calibers in length and had a lengthened high capacity chamber.19 The new T33 round’s projectile
left the barrel at a speed of 3,200 fps and could penetrate the Panther frontally at nearly 2,400
meters. While the combination of the longer gun and higher capacity ammunition was powerful,
the ammunition was too cumbersome; the T33 round was 50 inches in length and proved very
difficult to handle in a cramped tank turret during tests.20 The long rounds also created stowage
issues. Therefore, the gun was redesigned to fire two-piece ammunition, the resulting weapon
designated as the T15E2.
The T15E2 was first mounted on a production T26E3, Serial No. 97, and in March 1945
the Ordnance Department designated the vehicle as the T26E4. Additionally, they planned to
replace 1,000 M26s scheduled to be produced with T26E4s.21 The T26E4 pilot still had the two
large equilibrator springs, characteristic of the “Super Pershing,” mounted on top of its turret.
However, before production of the series began, a new hydropneumatic equilibrator that was
internally mounted was developed, and thus incorporated into all production vehicles.22 Only
twenty-five T26E4s were produced at the Fisher Tank Arsenal before the end of the war brought
production to a close. The two-piece ammunition proved to be too slow in loading during postwar firing tests in Aberdeen, and was made obsolescent by new gun developments.
The end of the war kept another variant of the T26 to a very limited production run and
relegated it to obscurity, namely the T26E5. The T26E5 was an assault tank version of the M26
and was built upon the successes and in the same vein as the M4A3E2 “Jumbo,” the assault tank
version of the M4. The final version of the T26E5 design incorporated glacis plate armor 6
inches thick at 45 degrees; bottom front armor measured 4 inches at 54 degrees. The turret
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boasted 7 ½ inch front, 3 ½ inch side, and 5 inch rear armor, while the gun shield, a weak spot on
the M26 at 4 ½ inches, was now 11 inches thick.23 Five-inch extenders were added to the T80E1
track, and despite the weight of the vehicle going up from 46.2 tons (92,355 pounds) to 51.2 tons
(102,300 pounds), an increase of five tons (9,945 pounds), ground pressure was reduced from
12.5 pounds per square inch to 11.9.24 However, during tests at Aberdeen in July 1945 it was
found that unless cross country speed was greatly reduced the added weight damaged the
suspension system.25 Only twenty-seven T26E5s were produced.
The 90-mm gun T54 was developed to create a gun that matched the ballistic
performance of the T15E2 in the T26E4, while using manageable one-piece ammunition.
Identical ballistics were achieved with a similar barrel. However, the round used, was both
shorter and fatter, making for convenient handling inside of a tank turret.26 Additionally, the
forward baffle on a standard M3’s muzzle brake was machined off then added to the T54,
leaving only a single baffle brake. In June 1945, Ordnance ordered the T54 to be mounted in two
M26 pilots, giving them the designation of M26E1. Not surprising, the M26E1 was very similar
to the T26E4. The M26E1 did have a new concentric recoil mechanism and new periscope, the
M83C. Also, the .30 cal. coaxial machine gun in the turret was substituted in favor of a
coaxial .50 cal. machine gun HB M2.27 Thirty-six main gun rounds were stowed in bins in the
turret floor and five were kept on the ready rack, for a total of forty-one. According to Hunnicutt,
the performance of the T54 in testing was exceptional. He notes, “The tests at Aberdeen, from
February 1947 to January 1949, indicated that the accuracy of fire from the 90-mm gun T54 and
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the reliability of its concentric recoil mechanism were excellent. The weapon was considered
superior to all other U.S. tank guns tested up to that time.28
With the close of the Second World War, the Defense Department’s budget was reduced
greatly almost overnight, and funds for tank development immediately dried up. Interestingly,
the U.S. Army foresaw the creation of heavier tanks and in May 1946 changed the designation of
the M26 from a heavy tank to a medium tank.29 Being limited with new vehicle development, the
Ordnance Department chose to focus on the more economical option of component development,
specifically engines and transmissions. As Hunnicutt points out, this is the same approach that
was taken prior to World War II in the 1930’s, and the right components needed were available
in 1940.30 The Ordnance personnel were not starting from scratch, however. The two most
important components needed for the modernization of the M26, the General Motors CD-850
cross-drive transmission and the air-cooled Continental AV-1790 engine, were both wartime
developments.31 The CD-850-1 had first been tested in a T25 series tank, and was later used in
both the T29 and T30 heavy tanks. The two heavy tanks employed Continental AV-1790 series
engines in conjunction with the CD-850-1; the T29 used the earlier AV-1790-1, and the T30
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used the following enhanced AV-1790-3, developing 740 and 810 hp at 2,600 and 2,800 rpm
respectively.32
In early 1948, the same engine/transmission combination as the T29 (AV-1790-1/CD850-1) was mounted in an M26 and given the designation of M26E2. In May, the vehicle arrived
for testing at Aberdeen Proving Grounds.33 The Continental AV-1790-1’s 740 horsepower
brought a substantial improvement in performance over the original Ford GAF motor, which
only produced 500 hp. This increase in horsepower from the large engine was only made
possible, however, because of the CD-850-1 cross-drive transmission. More than just a
transmission, the CD-850-1 was also used for steering and braking.34 The CD-850 series were
extremely compact in design, and combined with mounting ingenuity facilitated the use of the
bigger engine. For comparison, the power package of the M26 consisted of the 45 ½ inch long
Ford GAF engine, the 31 ½ inch Torqmatic transmission, and the 25-inch controlled differential,
for a total length of 102 inches.35 The power package of the M26E2 consisted of the 67 ½ inch
AV-1790-1 engine combined with only the 29 ½ inch CD-850-1, for a total length of only 97
inches, five inches less than the old system. Not only did the new combination take up less space,
but thanks to the use of new aluminum components instead of the customary steel, the total
weight of the power package was reduced by 1,000 pounds! Additionally, the cross-drive
transmission also allowed for a true neutral steer, permitting the tank to pivot in place.
Installation of the new components required modification though. Significantly more
armored grilling was added to the engine top deck to help circulate the air needed to cool the
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AV-1790 engine. The outside grills allowed cool air to be sucked into the compartment, which in
turn was pulled up past the fuel tanks, past up along the engine, and out the center grills.36 The
two engine exhaust pipes exited at the top center of the engine deck and led into mufflers that
laid exposed on the top of each fender. In addition, three armor covered ports were installed in
the rear hull armor to provide access to the cross-drive transmission.37
There was some serious initial consideration by the Ordnance Department to mounting
the T54 gun of the M26E1 in the new M26E2. Additionally, the high velocity 3-inch gun T98
was also considered and was later mounted in a M26E1 for testing. A meeting between the
Ordnance Department and the Army Field Forces in the spring of 1948 would alter these plans,
however.38 The meeting ruled that the original gun M3 would be used, but a bore evacuator
would be added and a single baffle muzzle brake installed in place of the usual double brake. The
primary concern of the muzzle brake was not to reduce recoil, but to redirect muzzle blast to the
sides. As mentioned above, too much blast directed at the ground would kick up significant
amounts of dust that would impair targeting.39 Regardless, the new gun was designated the
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M3A1.40 In addition, the standard M10F periscope was replaced with the improved M83
telescope that had first been installed on the M26E1.41 After the revisions for the M26E2 were
agreed upon, the vehicle was re-designated as the T40.
There were several major design changes that occurred after the redesignation.
Specifically, a small track tension idler was added on each side of the vehicle between the rear
roadwheel and the sprocket. The new idler helped maintain track tension during turns and over
rough terrain, and was intended to help correct some of the track throwing issues that had arisen
in earlier testing. Also, the AV-1790-1 engine was dropped in favor of its improved variant, the
AV-1790-3. The CD-850-1 was used initially, but similarly dropped in favor of the improved
CD-850-2. The fiscal budget for 1948 allowed for the production of ten medium tank T40s, and
in August 1949, the first production T40 arrived for testing at Aberdeen.42 To confuse the matter
somewhat, Ordnance action on 30 July 1948 standardized the vehicle as the medium tank M46
and marked the M26 as limited standard.43Additionally, the M46 was nicknamed the General
Patton. With no funding for new production available, modernization of the 2000 plus Pershings
in the U.S. Army inventory was the logical way forward.44
Tumultuous Cold War events in 1948 led to deteriorating relations between the Soviet
Union and the United States, and brought the atrophic readiness of the American military into
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perspective with the real possibility of American intervention in a military conflict through
conventional means.45 A special Congressional subcommittee, the final report of which was not
presented until late 1949, reported that American tank development was lagging far behind
Soviet heavy tank designs both in terms of numbers and capability.46 Additionally, the American
tank inventory possessed only outdated vehicles. Together these realizations brought new efforts
to accelerate the T40/M46 program. The 1949 budget provided for $74 million to convert 743
M26s to M46 standard with 1,215 M26s that were available for the following year.47
In November 1945, the Stilwell Board, named for its president Brig. Gen. Joseph W.
Stilwell, was convened to conduct a study on existing weapons and make recommendations for
the future.48 The findings of the board, released 19 January 1946, were largely approved on 22
May.49 The board made in-depth recommendations for tanks and was the source of post-war
component focused development. The board recommended specific standards for a new medium
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tank, but it would not be until be until late 1948, however, before the program was funded in any
fashion. The Army received $4,200,000 for developing the recommended tank, dubbed the T42.
In its final form, the T42 was better armored than the M26, had a greatly improved 90-mm gun
T119, employed the latest optics and fire control measures, and only weighed 37.25 tons (74,500
pounds).50 Unfortunately, however, the tank’s Continental AOS-895-3 (Air-cooled, Opposed,
Supercharged) engine was significantly underpowered, developing only 500hp at 2,800 rpms.
The Korean War suddenly began on 25 June 1950 and disrupted both the modernization
and the T42 programs. Admittedly, however, the T42’s insufficient power plant issues ultimately
doomed the design and not the war; the project was cancelled in 1953. By the fall of 1950
though, only roughly 400 M46s Pattons had been created through the modernization effort and
the armor emergency on the Korean Peninsula demanded that nearly all M26s be sent overseas.
The 73rd Tank Battalion, in Fort Benning, Georgia, for example, had to fill its ranks with M26s
from training units and pulled off of pedestals around the base. World-wide inventory of M26s
was only at 1800 and even the Patton was beginning to be obsolete in 1950. However, even with
the armor crisis, 75 M46 Pattons were still being manufactured per month, and the modernization
effort was eventually stepped up to 160 per month.51 The total to be converted was reduced to
983. The cost for each conversion was $100,000. Additionally, production of 942 new M46s was
scheduled to begin in January 1951.52 American industry was once again gearing up to aid the
nation, meanwhile U.S. tankers prepared for a fight.
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Chapter 4 - The M26 in Korea
The M26 Pershing and the M46 Patton contributed enormously to UN efforts during the
Korean War; for the M46 though, these contributions would not begin until September 1950
when it first arrived, and for the M26, would be limited to the first year of combat. The following
narrative, including several first-hand accounts of these tanks in action, illustrates the important
part that the M26 especially played in stabilizing the American efforts during the first year of the
war. One of the M26’s greatest services was its part in dispatching the aura of invincibility that
surrounded the Soviet-built tank used by the North Koreans, the T-34/85. By continuation, the
M26 was instrumental in the dismantling of the NKPA’s tank force in the first few months of
combat. Ultimately, the M26, while an aging relic of the Second World War, performed
admirably in Korea and contributed largely to the positive reversal of allied fortunes throughout
the war’s first year.
Steven Zaloga lists the number of tank-verses-tank engagements during the war at 119.1
Though an impressive number for what is generally considered an infantry war, these numbers in
no way begin to reflect the full combat service life of these tanks. To fully understand the extent
that the M26 participated in the war, however, would require an exacting chronologic unit study
of each battalion to field these tanks, namely the U.S. Army’s 70th, 73rd, and 6th, and the U.S.
Marines’ 1st Tank Battalion – a colossal undertaking. Interviews as well, with surviving tankers,
would need to be both collected and arranged. The excellent unit histories of these battalions
have already done some of this legwork, and their study would be a logical starting point, and, to
a limited degree, these histories were consulted in the writing of this chapter. However, study of
these battalions’ after-action reports, located at National Archives, College Park, MD would be
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equally important. For this study, the after-action reports of the 70th, 73rd, and 6th Battalions
were accessed.
This chapter chronicles the major events of the first few months of the Korean War in
four sections: first is a brief discussion of the North Korean invasion, with special attention to the
South Korean military reaction. Second, the UN decision and opening military intervention is
examined. Third, the M26’s first battlefield appearance in Korea is covered. The fourth and final
section is devoted to the M26 in the anti-tank role. Every major tank-vs-tank engagement
involving the M26 is mentioned, retracing Hunnicutt and Zaloga’s lead in this regard.
The Korean War was unprecedented in many ways, not least of which was its demand for
immediate American mobilization. During the urgent first days of the conflict in the summer of
1950, when the American demand for both material and personnel was furious, the M26 and to a
lesser degree the M46, were available. These tanks proved to be towers of strength against the
communist storm thrown at Korean and American fighting men - helping preserve a nation and
allowing many American soldiers and Marines to live and return home to remember a “forgotten
war” in peace.
The Invasion
On June 8, 1950 newspapers in Pyongyang, the capital of North Korea, published a
manifesto from the Central Committee of the United Democratic Patriotic Front calling for both
the north and south to hold elections and thus create a parliament. The newly elected body was to
meet in Seoul no later than August 15, the fiftieth anniversary of Korea’s first becoming a
protectorate under Japanese rule.2 Korean War historian T. R. Fehrenbach calls the manifesto a
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“storm signal,” a signal that was ignored entirely by the West.3 Beginning on 15 June, the Inmun
Gun, the North Korean People’s Army (NKPA), began positioning its divisions at key locations
just north of the 38th parallel. In the predawn hours of Sunday 25 June, over 90,000 soldiers,
including seven infantry divisions and one armored brigade, crossed into the south and achieved
complete surprise. The massive unannounced invasion across the 38th Parallel was a “blitzkrieg”
offensive intent upon quickly overrunning the Republic of Korea (ROK) Army and all of South
Korea, achieving by force what the manifesto could not, namely allowing for the unification of
the peninsula under communist control.
The North Koreans committed 150 Soviet-supplied T-34/85s. Thirty of these tanks were
shifted to the 7th Infantry Division at Inje in east central Korea, and the remaining 120 stayed
with the 105th Armored Brigade, the main powerhouse of the North Korean advance. 4 Roy E.
Appleman explains that the 105th included three tank regiments the 107th, 109th, and 203d—
each with forty tanks, and a mechanized infantry regiment, the 206th, with a strength of about
2,500 men.5 The North Korean tanks spearheaded the NKPA advance and helped to lead to the
rapid capture of Seoul, entering the northern edges of the South Korean capital by midnight of
the third day of the fighting, June 27.
For its part, the ROK Army was not prepared for the invasion. It had four infantry
divisions and one additional regiment stationed along their defensive line. However, an attack
was not expected and only one regiment from each division and one battalion from the additional
regiment were actually on the line. The ROK forces, though only slightly fewer in number than
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the NKPA aggressors, were largely newer troops who were facing off with hardened NKPA
forces who were in majority veterans.6 The ROK units were woefully under-equipped as well.
All of their weapons were second-string American relics of the Second World War. Their
American M3 105-mm howitzers had inferior range to the enemy’s artillery by several thousand
yards, permitting the North Koreans to strike ROK batteries, with no fear of return fire.7
Specifically, the Soviet-built 112-mm howitzers had a maximum range of 12,980 yards as
opposed to the M3’s 7,600.8 Also, the ROK anti-tank resources, 37-mm anti-tank guns and 2.36
inch “bazooka” rockets were incapable of destroying enemy T-34/85s. Perhaps, the greatest
handicap for the ROK forces was their lack of anti-tank (AT) mines; they only had the antipersonnel (AP) variety.9
The ROK Army did not have a single tank. Interestingly, in October of 1949 the ROK
Minister of National Defense had requested 189 M26 tanks, but Colonel William H. Sterling
Wright, acting for the chief of the United States Military Advisory Group to the Republic of
Korea (KMAG), founded in January of 1949, told the U.S. Army Chief of Staff, General J.
Lawton Collins to ignore the request.10 Collins informed the ROK minister that “rough terrain,
poor roads, and primitive bridges militated against efficient tank operations.”11 Around the same
time, KMAG acting chief, Colonel John E. Baird, without the permission of Chief KMAG, Brig.
Gen. William L. Roberts, informed the American Ambassador in South Korea, John Joseph
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Muccio, that the ROK forces were outnumbered by the North in all weapons except small arms.
Muccio dutifully passed Baird’s warnings along to Washington.
Paradoxically, however, Bryan R. Gibby records Roberts as the voice of reason to
Muccio where, in his opinion, the ROK Army “urgently require[d] strengthening.” 12 Regardless,
even the creation of the People’s Republic of China did not dissuade the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
which had been lulled into a false sense of security concerning South Korea, largely based upon
KMAG reports. In line with this, several months earlier, in June of 1949, Maj. Gen. Charles L.
Bolté , Director, Plans and Operations Division, Department of the Army had announced that the
ROK forces were actually better equipped than the NKPA.13 His announcement as well was also
largely based on the KMAG chief’s reports. Also at play was the reality that the United States
feared giving Syngman Rhee, the head of state of the provisional Republic of Korea, anything
other than defensive weapons, as some believed he would try to consolidate the two Koreas
under his rule.14
The disposition of the ROK forces at the time of the invasion also warrants brief mention.
The ROK defense of the town of Ch’unch’on in eastern central Korea from 25-28 June, in
particular, shows that if ROK units had not been caught unprepared, they could have made a
better showing of themselves. In Ch’unch’on, the defending ROK 6th Division had refused
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weekend passes to its soldiers, and as result the defenders were at full strength. Defending from
concrete pillboxes on high ground north of the city and with effective use of artillery, the ROK
6th Division stopped the enemy 2d Infantry Division, inflicting more than forty percent
casualties.15 On the night of the 26th, the 7th Infantry Division arrived to reinforce the 2d,
bringing with it its T-34/85s. Through the 27th the two enemy divisions combined to assault the
ROK defenders without dislodging them. However, with the collapsing ROK front elsewhere,
the ROK 6th Division had to abandon the town, and did so early on the 28th. Nine of the 7th’s T34/85s led the main body of the enemy as they occupied the town later the same day.16
Neither the ROK troops nor the American forces in Korea had an answer to the T-34/85.
According to Colonel Lloyd H. Rockwell, the ranking American advisor on scene during the
defense of the Munsan-ni-Ko-rangp’o-ri area, near the Imjin River north of Seoul, the ROK 13th
Regiment fought admirably but vainly. They tried desperately to repel the North Korean 1st
Division and supporting tanks of the 105th Armored Brigade after they had crossed the Imjin.
Roy Appleman writes of their efforts against the enemy T-34/85s:
At first some ROK soldiers of the 13th Regiment engaged in suicide tactics,
hurling themselves and the high explosives they carried under the tanks. Others
approached the tanks with satchel or pole charges. Still others mounted the tanks
and tried desperately to open the hatches with hooks to drop grenades inside.
These men volunteered for this duty. They destroyed a few tanks but most of
them were killed, and volunteers for this duty became scarce.17
Appleman’s sources suggest that about ninety ROK soldiers died valiantly in these attempts to
destroy enemy tanks during the battle near the Imjin River.18
Intervention
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The United Nations Security Council quickly responded to the invasion even before the
plight of the ROK soldiers was apparent. The member nations began their session at 2 p.m., June
25 (New York time).19 A unanimous vote, nine in favor and one abstention (Yugoslavia) soon
passed a resolution demanding, a cease to the fighting, North Korean to withdraw, and every
member nation to “render every assistance…in the execution of this resolution” and to “refrain
from giving assistance to the North Korean authorities.”20 A second resolution passed on the
night of the 27th called for member nations to give military aid to South Korea in repelling the
North Korean attack.21 However, the passing of these resolutions was only possible because the
Soviet delegate, Yakov Malik, was not present with the Security Council due to an ongoing
boycott of the UN in protestation of Nationalist China being represented there.22 Had Malik been
present, he could have vetoed the action since he was representing one of the five nations with
veto powers.
Nonetheless, President Truman received a grim reporting of the Korea situation on the
26th from the United States commander in the East, General Douglas MacArthur, which led him
to authorize MacArthur to use American naval and air power to aid the struggling ROK forces.
On 29 June, MacArthur personally investigated the situation in Korea. Shortly after 1000 hours,
he arrived at Suwon Airfield, approximately fifteen miles south of the southern edges of Seoul.
He was immediately informed by Maj. Gen. John H. Church, who had been sent ahead to bolster
South Korean resistance, that the accounted for ROK forces were expected to number only
25,000 by the end of the day.23 MacArthur insisted upon traveling northeast to the Han River
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which, running west to east, bisected the South Korean capital. During his trip to the southern
bank of the river and back, MacArthur saw countless numbers of refugees and thousands of
disorganized ROK troops fleeing from the encroaching enemy.24 MacArthur felt the situation
called for American troops intervening. His 29 June report, which stated as much, was received
by the Pentagon and immediately relayed to the President. The very next day, Truman authorized
MacArthur to use American ground forces.25
Only four American divisions, performing occupation duty in Japan, were available in the
Far East, the 24th Infantry, 25th Infantry, 1st Cavalry, and the 7th Infantry. The 29th RCT
(Regimental Combat Team) was also available. Collectively, they fell under the umbrella of the
Eighth Army. Each division was assigned its own tank battalion, but these battalions each only
had one full company of tanks which were M24 light tanks. The M24 tank was ideal for
occupation duty because its light weight allowed it to do the minimum amount of damage to
Japanese bridges and roads.26 It was a reconnaissance tank, however, and was never intended to
go toe-to-toe with medium tanks such as the T-34/85. Nevertheless, on 10 July several M24s
were committed to battle near Chonui in western South Korea. Two M24s were soon knocked
out; the 75-mm main gun of the M24 proving useless against the T-34/85, and the American
tank’s light armor protection proved equally worthless at stopping the 85-mm rounds. Before and
after this first tank-verses-tank encounter, ground forces were frantically rushed into Korea in an
effort to at first stop and then just slow the NKPA advance enough to permit time for the buildup
of friendly forces at the southeastern port of Pusan.27
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In the pre-dawn hours of 5 July, five days before the disappointing showing of the M24,
the men of the 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment, 24th Infantry Division dug in to defend
astride the road to Pusan eight miles south of Suwan. The battalion, given the name Task Force
Smith after its commander Lieut. Col. Charles B. Smith, was ordered by the commander of the
24th Infantry Division, Maj. Gen. William Dean, to block the NKPA route to Pusan. Every
anticipation was that these first Americans to meet the enemy would be successful. Lieutenant
Jack Doody, present that day, later tellingly recalled: “We thought the North Koreans would
back off once they saw American uniforms.”28 At dawn, eight enemy T-34/85s of the 107th Tank
Regiment, 105th Armored Division, advanced on the American position.29
All of the Task Force’s available anti-armor assets: including a battery of supporting 105mm M3 howitzers, the battalion’s 75-mm M20 recoilless rifle platoon, and all available 2.36inch M18 bazookas, engaged the enemy tanks. Unfortunately, none of the weapons had any
effect as the armor continued to advance. A forward positioned howitzer was finally able to
disable the two leading tanks with the Task Force’s only six High Explosive Anti-Tank (HEAT)
rounds, but that would be the only good news. Within two hours of the battle’s beginning, thirtythree enemy tanks had passed through the American lines, inflicting heavy casualties as they
went. A large enemy infantry-tank force arrived at 1100 hours. Smith’s men unleashed a barrage
that surprised the enemy column, but they were not dispersed. Instead, the enemy tanks moved in
close to the American line and raked it with heavy cannon and machine gun fire.30 The
battalion’s ammunition was nearly depleted and the men were under withering enemy fire. Smith
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attempted to coordinate an orderly retreat, but efforts towards control degenerated amidst the
carnage. The U.S. soldiers fled, abandoning much of their equipment.31
The M26 Enters the War
During the immediate scramble after the NKPA invasion, on June 28 Colonel Olaf P.
Winningstad, the Eighth Army Ordnance chief, located three M26 tanks at the Tokyo Ordnance
Depot.32 Having been neglected for years, they were in very poor condition and in need of engine
rebuilds. Army mechanics began extensive work to repair the tanks immediately and completed
the work on July 13. Since the proper fan belts were not available, Japanese replacements were
substituted. This proved a lasting problem. Despite multiple emergency orders, the belts were
consistently either too tight or too loose. Also, it was soon discovered that the improper fan belts
had the tendency to stretch once fitted causing the motors to overheat.33 Regardless, the tanks
were assigned to 1st Lieutenant Samuel R. Fowler and his fourteen-man enlisted section,
allotting the standard five crewman per tank: tank commander (TC), gunner, loader, driver, and
assistant driver (bow gunner). On 16 July, Fowler’s three Pershings landed at Pusan, being the
first Allied medium tanks to arrive in Korea.34 The tankers, having previously only been trained
on and accustomed to the M24 light tank, immediately sought to zero their tanks’ guns and
familiarize themselves with the heavier M26s.
The Eighth Army soon sent Fowler’s small tank force to help slow the enemy drive. They
went by rail to Chinju, a little over fifty miles west of Pusan, arriving at 0300 July 28.35 They
unloaded at the Rail Transportation Office on the south side of the Nam River. Fowler had his
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section remain in place as they awaited replacement fan belts. On the morning of July 31, the
NKPA 6th Division entered Chinju, although Fowler’s section was not involved.36 Appleman
mentions that flatcars were sent west to evacuate the tanks, but while they had passed through
Masan, they did not make it any further than Chungam-ni, twenty-five miles from Chinju.37 The
flatcars had been held up by congestion caused by the evacuation of supplies for the 19th
Infantry Regiment, of the 24th Infantry Division. At daybreak, Fowler received guidance from
his commander, Colonel Moore, by telephone. If the 19th Infantry Regiment northwest of Chinju
was overrun and he was unable to evacuate his tanks under their own power, then he was to
destroy them and evacuate his men by truck.38
After learning that flatcars had been sent to evacuate his tanks, Fowler elected to stay, not
realizing the cars were stuck in Chungam-ni. In the meantime, the 19th Regiment had been
overrun and the firing in Chinju began to go quiet. Around noon an ROK soldier informed
Fowler that only a handful of friendly troops were still in the town. Fowler still occupying the
rail station, was then strangely visited by William R. Moore, an Associated Press correspondent,
who reported that an unknown body of men were heading up the rail line. Around 1300, the men
were close enough for Fowler to have an interpreter call to them. They were soon identified as
North Koreans and a close-action firefight erupted. Lieutenant Fowler’s men opened up with
their tanks’.30 and .50 caliber machine guns, receiving a hail of enemy small arms fire. Fowler
was shot in his left side in the exchange, but his crew was able to pull him into his tank. The
enemy element, now identified as about platoon-sized in strength, was mostly killed or wounded.
The tankers, with their commander wounded, headed east along the road toward Masan.39
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Two miles from the rail station the M26s arrived at a blown bridge. The men dismounted
and prepared to evacuate by foot. After Lieutenant Fowler had been removed from his tank, his
men constructed a litter for him. He ordered the tanks destroyed by a grenade being dropped in
each one. As the three men designated for this task started forward, the North Koreans struck by
surprise. About half of the section sought cover underneath the blown bridge. Master Sergeant
Bryant E. W. Shrader had been the only man on the tanks at the moment of the ambush. He
returned fire with a .30 caliber machine gun. Eerily, a North Korean called out in English for the
men to surrender.40 Ignoring the enemy, Shrader drove his tank alongside another. From there he
opened the two escape hatches, located on the tank’s underside, and pulled in six others.41 He
could not get to the men trapped under the bridge, however, and drove back towards Chinju. The
tank engine soon overheated, stopped, and refused to restart. The men bailed out and darted into
bamboo thickets that lined the Nam River. After a great ordeal, the seven men safely reached the
friendly lines of the 25th Infantry Division near Masan. The men under the bridge were less
fortunate. All were killed, wounded, or captured. A few ran into nearby fields but were either
gunned down or captured.42 One of the men that was captured later stated that he saw the bodies
of Fowler and Moore floating in the water.
The M26 in the Anti-Tank Role
Thus, the first three M26s in the Korean War were captured by NKPA forces.
Fortunately, large numbers of American medium tanks were on their way to Pusan. The first to
arrive was the 8072nd Medium Tank Battalion, assembled from reclaimed M4A3 Shermans that
were scattered across the Pacific. The “roll-up” of lost equipment, which began in 1945 and
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continued through the Korean War, was ramped into high gear when hostilities in Korea had
begun.43 Of the 787 tanks to arrive in 1950, 45 percent were from these reclamation efforts.44 A
Co, 8072nd Tank Battalion landed first on July 31, and the remainder of the battalion followed
on August 4. Three days later the 8072 was redesignated the 89th Tank Battalion. A Co, 1st
Marine Tank Battalion, with their M26s, was the first stateside unit to land on August 2nd and
they would also be the first to be sent into combat.45 Three other medium tank battalions were
shipped from the United States along with their trained crews; the 73rd Tank Battalion was
equipped with M26s, the 70th with M26s and M4A3s, and the 6th with M46s.46
The M46s and the M26s of the 6th and 73rd Tank Battalions, respectively, as well as the
combined M26s and M4A3s of the 70th all began arriving at Pusan on August 8.47 The tank units
were immediately sent to bolster the perimeter defense around Pusan. The 6th was sent to the
Taegu area, sixty miles northwest of Pusan, as part of the Eighth Army’s reserve and the 70th to
the west to support the 1st Cavalry Division, which was above the 24th Infantry Division along
the east side of the Naktong River. 48 The three companies of the 73rd, each with twelve tanks,
were split up. A Co went to Ulsan, thirty miles northeast of Pusan, B Co went to the Kyongju
area, twenty miles north of Ulsan, and C Co reinforced the 27th Infantry Regiment
“Wolfhounds,” 25th Infantry Division north of Taegu, an area soon to be known as the “Bowling
Alley.”49 Meanwhile, the 72nd Tank Battalion and the remaining companies of the 1st Marine
Tank Battalion arrived at Pusan. By late August there were over 500 tanks within the perimeter.
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Excluding the M46s of the 6th Tank Battalion, there were roughly equal numbers of M26s and
M4A3s.50
On August 17, the M26s of 3rd Platoon, A Co., 1st Marine Tank Battalion would be the
first allied medium tanks to fight NKPA T-34/85s.51 Lt. Granville Sweet’s four tanks were sent to
support the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade (5th Marines) in the seizing of Obong-Ni Ridge,
located well on the east side of the Naktong River approximately twenty miles north of Masan.52
They were opposed by the 4th Infantry Division and their armored support, the 2nd Battalion,
109th Tank Regiment.53 Around 2000 hours, while the tanks were refueling, Sweet was radioed
“Flash Purple,” Marine code for imminent tank attack.54 He quickly moved his tanks into an
ambush position behind a hill on a bend in the road. Sweet positioned three of his tanks TSgt.
Cecil Fullerton’s A-34, Sgt. Gerald Swinicke’s A-33, and Sgt. Basilo Chavarria’s A-32 in a line
on the road itself, while his tank, A-31, fell in behind them (Sweet’s tank had a faulty gun
elevation mechanism).55 The road ran generally east-west and divided the 9th Infantry Regiment,
which defended the north side, from the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines (1/5) in the south. On Sweet’s
left, the southside of the road, a moderate hill that provided observation of the area was defended
by a Marine 75-mm recoilless rifle company and teams of Marines with 3.5-inch “super
bazookas” overwatching the road. 56 The 9th Infantry had infantry teams equipped with the 3.5inch “super bazookas” in their sector as well, though they were well forward of Sweet’s tank
position.
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Four enemy T-34/85s made their way east down the road. The tank platoon had
supporting infantry, but when Marine F4U Corsairs attacked the column these were largely dealt
with.57 The Marine pilots also claimed to have damaged one of the tanks as well. Marines on the
hill opposite of Sweet then opened up with bazooka and recoilless rifle fire on the tanks, igniting
some of their external fuel tanks but doing little else. The T-34/85s continued on undeterred.
Sweet radioed his platoon to use HVAP ammunition and then the lead enemy tank rounded the
bend in the road. Fullerton’s tank, A-34, fired first and then the other two. Zaloga explains:
Fullerton complained to his gunner, Sgt. Stanley Tarnowski, “You missed, Ski!”
Tarnowski replied “I don’t miss, Sergeant Fullerton.” Tarnowski had a reputation
in the unit as a crack shot, and it would be hard to miss at point-blank range. In
fact, the HVAP was such an overmatch for the T-34/85 glacis armor at such short
range that the rounds had passed through the tank. The first round had struck the
glacis near the hull machine gun, killing the gunner and killing or wounding the
loader before punching through the rear plate. Marines on a neighboring hill
thought they themselves were under fire when the three rounds impacted near
them. Curiously enough, the Marine tanks then burst into flames, though not from
enemy action. In the haste to finish refueling, a considerable amount of gas had
been spilled on the decks of some of the Pershings. The initial gun blasts ignited
the gasoline fumes; these were extinguished by the subsequent gun blast, only to
be ignited by the next shot in a curious pyrotechnic display.58
The HVAP rounds had gone through the lead tank so cleanly that no explosive fireball
was present to clue the next enemy tank in line on its fate. The second T-34/85 continued on
around the stopped lead tank and was slammed by a volley of Marine tank fire.59 In Hunnicutt’s
account of the battle, the second kill is attributed to Marine bazooka fire and not the M26s.60 One
round, whether bazooka or tank, struck the enemy tank’s turret which began to spin
uncontrollably towards the left. The tank fired but discharged the round harmlessly into the bank
of a hill. The third T-34/85 attempted to fire past the knocked-out tanks but was soon also
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pummeled by tank fire.61 Three of the tank’s crew managed to escape the tank, but they were
soon killed by small arms fire. The fourth T-34/85 did the only sensible thing and fled back
down the road it had come. It was ambushed and knocked out by soldiers from F Co, 9th Infantry
with bazookas. The tank, number 314, turned out to be the 2nd Battalion, 109th Regiment
commander’s. The T-34/85 was invincible in Korea no longer.
Soon after the fighting of the 17th, the NKPA was having success against ROK units
north of Taegu in the Tabu-dong area. Consequently, the 27th Infantry “Wolfhounds,” with C
Co, 73rd Tank Battalion in support, were sent by the commander of Eight Army, Lieut. Gen.
Walton Walker, to stabilize the lines.62 They had to defend the 27th Inf. occupying a large ridgelined valley. The ROK troops occupied the high ridges on either side of the valley. On the
evening of 21 August, the North Koreans began shelling the American positions, and just before
midnight the enemy 13th Division launched an attack against both the ROKs and the Americans.
In the valley, the NKPA attacked, having infantry attacking on either side, and nine tanks and
several self-propelled (SP) guns move down the road.63 The enemy armor, aiming at the 73rd’s
Pershings, fired rapidly and their armor piercing shells screamed down the valley and impacted
to the rear of the Americans. The streaking tracers of the enemy shells combined with the
cacophonous report of the enemy guns echoing endlessly in the valley caused soldiers from F
Co, 27th Infantry to dub the area the “Bowling Alley.”64
American indirect mortar and artillery fell on the approaching enemy. When the North
Korean troops entered the minefields that had been emplaced 150 yards in front of friendly lines
American machine guns opened up. The Pershings of the 73rd Tank Battalion held their fire as
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well, not engaging the lead T-34/85 in the enemy column until it was only 125 yards away. 3.5 in
bazooka teams hit the second and third vehicles, both self-propelled guns. According to
Appleman’s account “Artillery and 90-mm. tank fire destroyed seven more enemy tanks, three
more SP guns, and several trucks and personnel carriers. This night battle lasted about five hours.
The fire from both sides was intense.”65 Over 1300 of the enemy were killed their battalions had
been reduced by seventy-five percent strength.66 Another enemy attack on the 27th met similar
results. After two days of fighting, the NKPA attacks were repulsed by the 27th Infantry and the
Pershings. They destroyed thirteen more T-34/85s and five SU-76M assault guns with no
Pershings lost.67 One cannot help but be curious how Task Force Smith mentioned above would
have fared had they been reinforced with such tank support.
The last large-scale tank-verses-tank actions occurred soon after the landing of the
American X Corp at Inchon on September 16. The successful landings, a mere twenty miles west
of Seoul, contributed to forcing the NKPA to retreat back to the North. The North Korean
soldiers were nearing exhaustion even before the landings. Since the June 25 invasion, the march
down the peninsula had constantly attrited their numbers, tanks, transport vehicles, and other
pieces of equipment. A good number of the enemy T-34/85s had broken down during the lengthy
marches and were simply left on the side of the road, even more were eliminated by UN air
power, however. Incessant air attack forced the North Koreans to only move their tanks at night
and come up with creative methods to camouflage them during the day.68 After 1 September, the

65

Ibid., 359.
Ibid., 60.
67
Ibid., 65.
68
Order of Battle Handbook (NKPA), Special Planning Staff, G2 GHQ, FEC, Sec. 6, 1, 4, 5, quoted in
“Enemy Tactics” (monograph, Headquarters, Eight U.S. Army Korea,1952), 58, accessed on April 26, 2018,
http://www.koreanwar-educator.org/topics/reports/after_action/enemy_tactics_in_korea_field_study_dec_1951.pdf.
“The enemy adapted many camouflage measures in order to deceive United Nations airmen. When UN aircraft
approached, the enemy tank crews lit smudge posts or oily rags near the tanks to give the impression that the tanks
66

93
NKPA tellingly dispersed the tanks of the 105th Armored Division amongst the infantry
divisions surrounding Pusan.69 The move no doubt was an effort to bolster the infantry lines, but
it also reflected an attempt to minimize tank casualties. Concentrated tank assembly areas invited
UN air attack. Furthermore, the move was indicative of an enemy realization that gone were the
days of the NKPA armored spearhead.
A wartime study of armor conducted by the Operations Research Office (ORO) examined
239 knocked out or abandoned T-34s spread across the theater from Pusan to Pyongyang.70 The
ORO report sheds special light on enemy tank casualties, concluding that 102 or 43 percent had
been destroyed by UN aircraft. Napalm was the most effective weapon, destroying 60 of these
tanks.71 The second greatest cause of loss, surprisingly, was due to mechanical issue, as 59 or
nearly 25 percent had been abandoned by their crews. The third largest contributor was tank fire,
with 39 or 16 percent being destroyed.72 Admittedly, some confession was made in the findings
to suggest that exact numbers could not be obtained as the enemy was able to recover some
vehicles. The results were muddled further by the fact that the enemy had no spare parts to speak
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of and cannibalization of damaged tanks was frequent. Therefore, a tank that may well have been
recoverable under better circumstances was made a total loss for lack of parts.
To make matters worse for the enemy, the major NKPA offensives of August and
September against the defense around Pusan were costly and, while they had affected
breakthroughs in the UN line, they had not achieved their desired result of collapsing the
perimeter. The NKPA had tried and failed to capture key road hubs within the north (Taegu) and
west (coastal roads) parts of the perimeter. Success in either region would have seriously
endangered the supply of allied forces, endangering Pusan, and likely led to the consequent
collapse of the perimeter.73 Several reinforcing NKPA divisions were sent to help regain the
initiative but not to refill the many seriously depleted units. Replacement T-34/85s were also
sent, but UN aircraft kept these from having any real affect.74 Despite reinforcement attempts,
NKPA numbers and morale dwindled. Supply lines were precariously overextended and halfstarved, despairing enemy soldiers were only kept in line by fanatical NKPA junior leadership.75
American leadership pre-decided to delay the Eighth’s general offensive one day,
allowing time for word of the American landings in the NKPA rear to reach the enemy troops
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around the perimeter. However, on September 17, after the landings at Inchon, North Korean
leadership opted not to inform their men of the situation. Thus, NKPA resistance was initially
stiff when the Eighth Army started its planned breakout. Many UN units were still even on the
defensive, but North Korean resolve soon melted and panic took its place. The NKPA retreat in
front of forces in the south soon turned into an open route. MacArthur’s bold decision to land
the X Corps at Inchon had paid off, and the North Korean military leadership were caught
completely off guard with overextended forces.76
North Korean generals withdrew the 105th Armored Division from around the Pusan
perimeter and sent the unit northward to attack the American beachhead. Little would come from
this move, however. The NKPA had relatively few forces in the Seoul area at the time, and the
only armor to speak of were the eighteen T-34/85s of the 42nd Mechanized Regiment, a recently
formed unit.77 The 42nd Mechanized was all but be wiped out by September 20. According to
Zaloga, three T-34/85s attacked the beachhead on the first day of the American landings and
were destroyed by allied aircraft.78 Oscar E. Gilbert corroborates Zaloga’s account but goes
further, showing that there were six T-34/85s heading south from Seoul to the beachhead and
that the Air Force only got three of them.79
According to Gilbert, the three remaining enemy tanks were destroyed by tanks from Lt.
Granville Sweet’s tank platoon. When Sweet’s tanks and accompanying Marine infantry arrived
at the hills where the air force had reportedly destroyed three T-34/85s, he ordered two of his
tanks, commanded by Cecil Fullerton and Joe Sleger, to move up onto a hill that had observation
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down a blind curve the Marine infantry were about to go around.80 Once there, the two tankers
spotted three T-34/85s waiting to ambush the infantry. Sleger recollects: “We looked down, and
just beyond the bend, there’s three tanks—T-34s…We positioned ourselves abreast of each
other, and pumped rounds into the broadside of these three tanks. I think we put about twenty
rounds of ammunition into them.”81 Since the Second World War, American tankers were in the
practice of shooting enemy tanks until they burned.
At 0615 the following morning, September 17, six more T-34/85s from the 42nd
Mechanized escorted by two to three hundred infantry from the 18th Infantry Division, made
their way to recapture Kimpo Airfield located south of the Han River on the western edge of
Seoul. Near the airfield, the enemy force stumbled into a prepared position of the 2d Battalion,
5th Marines supported with M26s from 1st Platoon, A Co., 1st Marine Tank Battalion. The
Marines and tanks eliminated the enemy force within five minutes at the cost of only two
Marines wounded.82 The M26s opened up on the enemy tanks at 600 yards, firing at the trail tank
and working their way to the front to ensure they got them all.83 Interestingly, the Marine tankers
had made the same mistake that Lt. Sweet’s men had made one month earlier near Oblong-Ni.
They had HVAP loaded. “We loaded anticipating the tanks,” said Bob Miller, one of the tank
commanders, “… I fired two rounds and it looked like I missed the damn thing! I decided what I
was doing was going in one side and out the other. We loaded HEs, and that blew the darn turrets
off. That busted ‘em up.”84
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The Marines were not always on the giving end of an ambush, however. During the
fighting outside of Seoul, on the road to the town of Sosa, 2nd Platoon, B Company, 1st Marine
Tank Battalion’s was suddenly hit by an NKPA ambush.85 As the lead tank, commanded by Lt.
Bryan Cumming, entered a narrow cut in a north-south running ridge heavy enemy small arms,
several anti-tank guns, and a hidden T-34/85 tank engaged it. The Marines’ accompanying
infantry were knocked off the deck of the M26, and enemy infantry swept down from their
positions to overwhelm the tank. The following account reveals well the chaos of what close
action in an M26 was like:
The lieutenant barely had time to grab one of the riflemen by the collar and pull him
through the hatch and into the tank before enemy infantry swarmed down the
embankments and onto the vehicle. The Tank’s crew, meanwhile returned fire with
machine guns and cannon. Before long a well-placed enemy round broke the track,
immobilizing the tank. Acrid fumes from the machine guns and the gas that rushed out
whenever the loader opened the breech of the main gun filled the vehicle. The harried
Cummings discovered what many World War II tankers had learned the hard way:
otherwise hardened infantrymen grew extremely claustrophobic when locked inside
cramped tanks with enemy fire hammering on the hull. When the rifleman he had just
saved from death or capture went berserk inside the besieged vehicle, Cummings
knocked him unconscious.
Gasping for breath, Cummings opened the pistol port on the side of the turret to
let some of the choking gas escape. Almost immediately a North Korean grenade flew
through the opening and exploded inside the turret. The shrapnel wounded Cummings,
his gunner, and the incapacitated rifleman. With no time to spare, Sergeant Marion
Altaire moved his own M26 into the road cut and “scratched the back” of Cummings’
immobilized tank with machine gun fire, knocking the NKPA attackers to the ground.
More help was on the way. Sergeant Arthur R. “Slope Plate” MacDonald led his section
into the cut to assist the trapped Americans. He slammed round after round at the antitank guns at close range. Although at the time no one could see the effect of the fire, after
the chaotic fight ended the Marines counted six anti-tank guns and a T-34 destroyed.86

After the September 17 ambush, the remaining dozen tanks of the 42nd Mechanized were
eliminated over the course of the next three days. Another new unit, the 43rd Tank Regiment was
also sent south to combat the Americans near Seoul on September 25th.87 The 43rd immediately
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lost twelve T-34/85s, seven of which being destroyed by Marine M26s. During the fighting for
Seoul itself, the M26s were not needed to combat enemy tanks but were used rather to support
infantry in close urban action and for knocking down the many barricades that the NKPA had
thrown up across the city’s streets. By early October, the NKPA tank force was largely
eliminated, the 105th Armored Division included.88
General MacArthur adamantly wished to pursue the enemy into North Korea. On 27
September, the Joint Chiefs of Staff delivered to MacArthur Washington’s approval for the
Eighth Army to cross the 38th parallel in pursuit of the NKPA.89 And by 26 October, UN forces
had reached the Yalu River, the natural boundary between North Korea and Manchuria, at
Chosan; specifically a reconnaissance platoon of 7th Regiment, 6th ROK Division, ROK II
Corps.90 The men even filled bottles of water for souvenirs, but their celebration would be shortlived. 91
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Chapter 5 - The M26 in the Infantry Support Role
The accounts included in the last chapter are a little deceptive, because they focus heavily
on the M26’s encounters with NKPA T-34/85s. The primary role that the M26, as well as the
M4A3 and M46, fulfilled in Korea was infantry support, especially after the NKPA tanks were
defeated by November 1950, and even more so when the Chinese entered the war. Between 14
and 20 October, the Chinese secretly sent elements of the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army
(PVA), namely the 38th, 39th, 40th, and 42nd Armies, with three divisions each, into North
Korea. Accordingly, the stakes were raised when these forces first engaged UN forces on 25
October.1 Thereafter, UN tank support was often the difference between mission success and
rout. For example, on 1 November, the Eighth Army’s center, near Unsan, was hard pressed and
a number of M46s from the 6th Tank Battalion and one platoon of M26s from B Company, 70th
Tank Battalion were sent to help. The tanks greatly assisted elements of the ROK 12th Regiment
in an attempt to regain ground just north of the city.2 Actions like this were common for
American tanks in Korea. They served in a variety of capacities supporting ground forces.
To best illustrate this, the 1st Marine Division was rescued, in large part, because of a
single M26. Donald C. Snedeker’s November 2000 article in the Marine Corps Gazette, “One
was enough,” details the account fully. SSG Russell A. Munsell and his crew in the M26
Pershing, D-23, played an invaluable role in the withdraw of 1st Division Marines from the
Chosin Reservoir area on 29 November – 3 December 1950. Snedeker contends…
In the pre-dawn hours of 27 November, elements of eight Chinese divisions from the
CCF IX Army Group had emerged from hiding and advanced toward the Marine positions just
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west of the Chosin Reservoir, near the Yalu.3 MacArthur had underestimated the new enemy’s
resolve and strength, informing his command that they would be ‘home by Christmas.’4 U.N.
forces, following their commander’s lead, looked forward to a planned victory parade in Tokyo.
The same morning, the 5th and 7th Marines, 1st Marine Division, with the 11th Marines
providing artillery support, attacked towards the Yalu. Chinese forces were reported everywhere
and Marine progress was slow. The division commander, Maj. Gen. Oliver P. Smith felt armor
would assist the attack, saying: “get some tanks up to Yudam-ni.”5 Years later, Smith said of the
battle:
Litzenberg [Commander 7th Marines] went on up the road and met these people
just below Chinhung-ni, and they had quite a fight. Litzenberg had 43 killed and a
couple of hundred wounded, but they absolutely decimated this 124th CCF
Division. Then we took it kind of slow from there on out. I was hoping that we
wouldn’t have to get up on that plateau, which was 4,000 feet up with winter
descending and only one road going up there. And the Army had become
somewhat sobered by the experiences of the 1st Cavalry Division in the West.
The Chinese had sent in an advance force over there just like they had sent in an
advance force over on our side, and the 1st Cavalry Division lost practically an
entire regiment. It was surrounded and chopped up.6
One platoon of four Shermans from the 1st Marine Tank Battalion’s inventory was sent
north from the division’s HQ at Hagaru-ri, sixteen miles to the south. Four miles up, all four
tanks skidded to the side of the icy road.7 Three were able to regain the road and turn around but
the fourth threw a track and was left to be recovered the next day. The decision was for the best,
no doubt, as the 4,700-foot-high Toktong Pass, with sheer cliffs on both sides, lay three miles
further up the road.8 Sadly, tanks being lost in this way was not unheard of. The U.S. Army 72d
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Tank Battalion, for example, lost two Shermans to terrain early on the next year. At midnight on
3 February 1951, “Two M-4 tanks from ‘C’ Co. rolled over a cliff enroute to WONJU.”9 That
was the entirety of the battalion’s S-3 Journal entry.
Nevertheless, the Marine tankers believed their M26s, with their wide tracks, greater
width and weight, as well as torqmatic transmission, would fare better.10 As a test, 1st Lieut.
Richard A. Primrose and his best driver, Sgt. Clyde Kidd, took a single M26 from his platoon, D23, up the treacherous road. He made it to Yudam-ni without incident in the early afternoon.11
Primrose and Kidd flew back to Hagaru-ri. The lieutenant intended to bring his platoon up early
the following day, but conditions on the ground had changed. The Marine attack had stalled by
the afternoon on the 27th and during the night the large numbers of enemy had established
roadblocks cutting the road on both sides of Hagaru-ri.
The morning of the 28th, Primrose’s platoon of M26s and Marine infantry attempted to
advance in force north to Yudam-ni. Three miles up the road, the Marines met fierce resistance
and were forced to return. By this time the situation was dire for the Marines in Yudam-ni and
Col. Homer Litzenberg, commander 7th Marines, put out a call for a tank crew. The situation
was equally as calamitous for the Marines in Hagaru-ri, however, and Primrose needed every
man in his platoon. His tanks helped protect the perimeter through desperate fighting, cutting
down hundreds of enemy attackers. On the 29th, Primrose would make another attempt to
advance in force to relieve the beleaguered Marines in Yudam-ni, but this attempt also would get
turned back.12
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SSG Munsell and his crew, from C Co., 1st Tank Battalion, volunteered to man M26 D23. The Marine tankers were flown in to Hagaru-ri on the morning of the 29th, while Lt.
Primrose’s led the second attack north. Munsell and crew were then flown to Yudam-ni where
they immediately worked to get the M26 serviceable. Without having been started in two days,
the tank’s batteries were now dead and its fan belts were frozen to the consistency of hard
plastic.13 The necessary parts were replaced and the tank was made ready for operation.
Fortunately, the enemy did not attack Yudam-ni that night. Maj. Gen. Smith received permission
to withdraw the bulk of his division at Yudam-ni back to Hagaru-ri. While much of Eighth Army
openly fled before Chinese attacks, Smith, in true Marine fashion, kept his fighting edge intact.
“Retreat, Hell! We’re just attacking in another direction.”14
Lt. Col. Raymond L. Murray, commander of 5th Marines, and Col. Litzenberg of 7th
Marines planned and implemented the breakout, and at 0900 1 December, the Marine infantry
advanced along the high ground on either side of the road, fighting through enemy positions as
they went. At noon, SSG Munsell’s D-23 led the remaining combat elements out along the road,
encountering an enemy roadblock almost immediately.15 The Marines ground forward amidst
heavy losses and despite bitter cold, harsh terrain, and fanatical enemy resistance.16 Roadblocks
were encountered along the road about one every mile, but fortunately the enemy did not have
any anti-tank weapons covering them, only machine gun emplacements. These were
systematically eliminated by cannon and machine gun fire from the M26.
The Marines fought on for more than four days without sleep and in twenty-below
temperatures. In total, D-23 helped destroy seven roadblocks and countless enemy
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emplacements, but SSG Munsell and his crew did not just contend with the enemy. Keeping their
vehicle fueled was a constant struggle and the tankers at one point had to siphon gas from
abandoned vehicles along the route to continue.17 H.W. MacDonald sheds further light on the
fuel economy of these tanks: “Fuel consumption at present is not as high as it was during the
cold winter weather; on approach marches the M46 uses about 4 gal/mile …”18 However, in
addition to taking place during a remorselessly cold early winter, the Marine advance was
agonizingly slow. Consequentially, Snedeker points out that the M26 used 20 gallons of gas an
hour just idling.19
Eventually, the newly installed batteries surrendered to the constant strain 72 hours into
the battle. Munsell had planned accordingly though, and had brought spares. His men changed
them under fire. Human endurance was also at a breaking point, however, and at the 96-hour
mark Munsell’s loader collapsed from exhaustion, no doubt accelerated by fume inhalation.20 A
more than willing Marine infantry replacement was found. Soon thereafter, the M26 bottomed
out on a snow drift while it maneuvered to engage enemy positions. After being stuck for six
hours, Munsell, with great effort and the help of an engineer dozer, finally got the tank free. D23 made it the sixteen miles to Hagaru-ri, but not before it ran out of gas several hundred yards
from the perimeter. 5th, 7th, and 11th Marines, 1st Marine Division also made it, thanks in no
small measure to this single M26 that had spearheaded the road advance for the bulk of the force
as well as provided fire support for the wing advances.
The Marine ordeal was not over, however. On 6 December, the Marines made the elevenmile fighting withdrawal from Hagaru-ri to Koto-ri, SSG Munsell and D-23 were among them.
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From there, the Marines eventually made their way to Hungnam for extraction.21 Amazingly, no
Marine was left behind. Dead or alive, all of the 1st Marine Division left the Chosin Reservoir
area together.22 Prior to stepping off for Koto-ri, however, some of 1st Marine’s officers
questioned whether the march was possible with such a large enemy presence still in the vicinity
and with a physically exhausted and depleted force. Col. Lewis Burwell “Chesty” Puller,
commander 1st Marines, 1st Marine Division, replied, saying it best: “I don’t give a good
goddamn how many Chinese laundrymen there are between us and Hungnam. There aren’t
enough in the world to stop a Marine regiment going where it wants to go! Christ in His mercy
will see us through.”23
Like with its assistance to the 1st Marine Division, the M26’s role in infantry support was
multifaceted. It was employed in all of the following roles: (1) mobile artillery, (2) enemy
strongpoint elimination, (3) convoy escort, (4) casualty recovery, (5) battlefield-expedient
ambulance, (6) heating food, (7) assisting other vehicles in crossing fords, (8) perimeter defense,
and (9) deep penetrations of enemy lines. The M26 was frequently rolled up on embankments
where the maximum range of its 90-mm M3 guns could be achieved. Doing so increased the
maximum elevation of the gun M3/M3A1 beyond the 20 degrees elevation possible on level
ground.24 At 45 degree, 37 mins, the gun could launch an H.E. shell 17,886 meters (11.1
miles).25 Located just above the M26’s recoil cylinders was the Elevation Quadrant M9, a
standard device on all American tanks.26 It permitted the tank gun, normally a direct-fire
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weapon, to be used for indirect fire.27 The tank registered its gun much as an artillery piece
would, and on such an angled platform, with its barrel pointing skyward at similar angles, the
M26 even somewhat resembled one.
Accuracy was excellent. Furthermore, the M26 boasted mobility and a rate of fire that
regular artillery could not match.28 Oftentimes, even with these advantages, tanks were used in
the artillery role only because battlefield conditions mandated thus. A unit report, dated August
1951 provides special insight into M26s being employed in the indirect artillery role:
Tank trafficability throughout the period was extremely limited due to weather
conditions and an unusual amount of rain-fall, tanks were limited to operations on
hard surfaced roads. Tanks of the Battalion were employed during this period in
indirect fire missions with good results. Indirect fire missions were controlled thru
the artillery battalion’s fire direction centers. Using the tanks of the Battalion in
this manner served two purposes. It enabled the tank crews to get some practical
training in indirect fire methods. Also utilized the tank guns with their high rate of
fire when ground conditions prohibited the use of tanks in their normal role.
Throughout the period all attempts to maneuver off of the roads resulted in mired
equipment.29
Tanks were commonly used as mobile artillery in Korea. Nevertheless, this report would seem to
indicate that the M26 was seen as more valuable in close operational support rather than in the
indirect role, as it labels the former as the “normal role.”
The HE round from the 90-mm gun was most effective for strongpoint elimination. On
15 September 1950, six M26s, under the command of Lieut. Granville Sweet, landed to support
the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines in the taking of Wolmi-Do (Wolmido) Island located one kilometer
offshore of Inchon. One of the M26s put a 90-mm shell into a cave full of NKPA defenders.
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Thirty enemy soldiers immediately walked out hands raised.30 Soon thereafter, a section of M26s
helped eliminate enemy fortified positions on Sowolmi-do, a small islet to the south of WolmiDo that was connected by a narrow causeway.31 The M26 served as a battlefield multiplier when
in close support of infantry. Not only was direct action fire support, such as eliminating enemy
bunkers, tactically tangible but the simple presence of an “iron angel” could be instrumental with
infantry morale.32
In contrast, however, the M26 proved ill-designed for the long road marches demanded
by convoy escort. Its poor fuel economy, consequent limited range, sluggish acceleration
characteristics, and high maintenance requirements made it an illogical choice for such use.
Typically, using a medium tank for convoy escort was also a waste of a valuable resource.
However, M26s could be effectively used to provide security for advancing columns. Such was
the case with elements of the 1st Marine Division after Inchon. The Marines used amphibian
tractors, that were designed only to get Marines safely to shore, as armored personnel carriers on
the Inchon-Seoul highway.33 Escorting M26s provided security to their flock of irregular
vehicles despite NKPA ambush and anti-tank mine traps.34 Nonetheless, MacDonald makes the
unsurprising and hard to refute conclusion that a light tank would better fulfill the convoy escort
role.35
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Regarding casualty recovery, the M26 was used as a means of collecting wounded
infantrymen in exposed areas. The tank would simply drive over the wounded man and pull him
into the tank via the two escape hatches on the tank’s underside.36 Similarly, in emergency
situations the wounded were loaded on the engine deck of the M26 to facilitate easier transport.
Also, many images exist of infantrymen riding aboard M26s in Korea simply to avoid a long foot
march. Another comfort for the infantry was the Pershing’s “ability” to heat food. In the sub-zero
temperatures of Korea, a warm meal could be had simply by asking the tanker to start up his tank
and then throwing the K-ration meal on the back plate. It would be piping hot in a couple of
minutes.
Tanker-Infantry transactions, however, were not limited to culinary diplomacy, nor were
they always pleasant. The M26 had an infantry phone on the back right side of its rear hull for
use in combat. When needed, a stalwart infantryman could approach the back of the forty-six ton
vehicle, pick up the phone, and be plugged in directly with the tank crew’s intercom system. This
allowed for clear communication, often for the coordination of direct fire, when the crew was
buttoned up and radios were not available or having issue. Alternatively, however, the nature of
close coordination between infantry and armor often dictated that ground forces operate out front
of the Pershing, sometimes in near proximity to its “business” end.
As mentioned above, the M26’s muzzle brake diverted propellant gases to either side of
the muzzle, preventing dust on the ground from being stirred up but also producing terrific
muzzle blast to the front and sides, especially the sides. Therefore, standing anywhere near the
“business” end was unpleasant to say the least. One combat cameraman Lt. Robert L. Strickland,
71st Signal Service Battalion, recalled his time with the 1st Marine Division in the fighting for
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Seoul: “About that time the tanks started firing their 90s right over our heads. The blast was so
terrible that I still can’t hear well today.”37 Strickland also related another story where muzzle
blast unsettled him: “I got ready to shoot. Just as the tank got in the frame, one of the Marines
fired a carbine about six inches from my nose. The camera lens went straight up and I was
madder than a wet hen until I saw a sniper fall out of a tree behind me.”38
In addition, the M26 was heavy enough that it could pull other vehicles across rivers that
otherwise might risk being swept away. Similarly, Pershings were capable of self-loading, or
pulling themselves and other Pershings onto railcars, making preparation for rail transport
slightly less of an ordeal.39 Tanks were also ideal for perimeter protection as Snedeker’s article
illustrates: “As they descended into snowbound Ha garu-ri, SSgt. Munsell and his crew could see
the results of the brutal CCF attack that had finally been stopped just a few hours earlier. Within
200 yards of the Provisional Tank Platoon's 3 Shermans alone, there were over 650 enemy
bodies-already frozen in the grotesque geometry of death.”40
Lastly to be mentioned, the M26 was employed heavily in the deep penetrations of
enemy lines. General Mathew Ridgway developed a winning strategy after the Chinese entered
the war. It included forcing the enemy to attack against solid defensive lines and willingly giving
ground in favor of inflicting damage upon him. Then, he would strike deep with armored
spearheads into the overextended enemy’s rear area inflicting maximum casualties on
unprepared enemy forces. Though brutal, this “meat grinder” technique proved itself somewhat
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effective and a role for which the Pershing tank was well-suited.41 The tank-infantry task force
prototypes of this technique, however, came during Eight Army’s breakout following the
landings at Inchon in mid-September 1950. The ORO report expounds on the drives of Task
Force Lynch and Task Force Dolvin:
The ability of armor to exploit a breakthrough was illustrated by the 172-mile
drive of Task Force Lynch from Taegu to Suwon in 48 hours to link up with the
7th Division moving inland from the Inchon beachhead, and the drive of Task
Force Dolvin from Chinju to Nonean, a distance of 150 miles, between 25-30
September. Such operations were frequent during the period following the
breakout from the Naktong line and the subsequent advance up the peninsula, and
generally involved one or two companies of tanks, each operating in conjunction
with a company of infantry, with mortar, signal, medical, and engineer
detachments, and with a TACP [Tactical Air Control Party] to call in air strikes.
From the experience obtained during these operations, there emerged the plan for
the fully integrated tank-infantry teams which played a large part in the advance
of the UN forces…42
Billy C. Mossman tells the story of the further implementation of such practices in the
sections devoted to Operation Wolfhound, Task Force Johnson, and Operation Thunderbolt.43
Operation Wolfhound was a single-day reconnaissance in force operation conducted towards the
Suwon-Osan area on 15 January 1951.44 The 27th Infantry Regiment “Wolfhounds,” bolstered
with a battalion of tanks and artillery and engineers, carried the attack forward. The formidable
UN reconnaissance encountered only limited resistance, however, reinforcing suspicions that the
Chinese only had the 50th Army acting as a reconnaissance screen forward of their main line. At
a loss of three killed and seven wounded, Operation Wolfhound inflicted 1,380 enemy casualties,
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not nearly as many as intended, but impressive none the less.45 Ridgeway saw the operation as
successful and ordered his commanders to plan similar operations.
On 22 January, Task Force Johnson, named after Col. Harold K. Johnson, commander
8th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Cavalry Division, was launched with similar results.46 The 1st Cavalry
Division led attack was built around the M4A3E8s and M26s of the 70th Tank Battalion. Only
limited enemy resistance was met though, prompting General Ridgway to escalate
reconnaissance in force operations to determine true enemy dispositions.47 On 24 January,
Operation Thunderbolt was launched. Two armored-led spearheads, roughly division-sized each,
advanced northward from the IX and X Corps lines with the lower bank of the Han River as their
final objective. Only pockets of enemy resistance were met initially and the reconnaissance in
force quickly turned into a general attack involving the entire Eighth Army.48 The advance was
systematically coordinated through five east-west-running phase lines.
Eventually an enemy screen of seven divisions stiffly opposed the advance, but by 2
February, the Eighth Army began consolidating a solid new defensive line south of the Han
River. Throughout all of these operations, Ridgeway saw destruction of enemy forces and the
potentiality to draw him into overcommitment of his forces, while closely protecting the integrity
of U.N. forces, as his only mission.49 The acquisition of lost ground and political objectives, such
as the recapture of Seoul, were only incidental in importance. Therefore, the offense potential of
tanks, namely their firepower, mobility, and armored protection, were essential in Ridgeway’s
greater strategy. Every reconnaissance in force in early 1951 was spearheaded by tanks.
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The greater armor protection and firepower of the M26/M46 as compared to the M4A3
allowed it to receive a higher combat record.50 In the early months of the fighting, when
encountering an NKPA T34/85 was more likely, the M26 was preferred by tank crews. In the
latter part of the war the lighter and more conveniently-sized M4A3 was preferred. The fighting
stalemated in the peninsula’s central mountainous region where the M26’s sluggish hill
performance and sloppy transmission became more of a liability.51 Zaloga comes down hard on
the M26 in his final assessment, dramatically favoring the Sherman: “Those tankers with
experience in the M4A3E8 preferred it over the M26, since it was more reliable, easier to
maintain, and far more nimble to drive. Its automotive performance in the hilly Korean
countryside was far superior to that of the M26, and its firepower was perfectly adequate against
the now rarely encountered T-34-85.”
Zaloga continues to favor the Sherman by leaving his final evaluation of the M46 open to
interpretation, curtly concluding: “The M46 cured many of the problems encountered with the
M26 due to the introduction of a new engine and cross-drive transmission, and so was preferred
over the M26.”52 However, Zaloga’s most famous non-Osprey book on tanks, Armored
Thunderbolt: The U.S. Army Sherman in World War II (Stackpole Books, 2008) is devoted
almost exclusively to the Sherman. Only four of its 360 pages deal with the T26, and these are
mostly filled with illustrations.53 By default, with two different tanks employed side-by-side, the
successes of the one diminished the perceived sufficiency of the other to a comparative eye and
perhaps Zaloga, with his years of study, grew understandably attached to the ubiquitous
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Sherman. The author can somewhat relate. Regardless, the Sherman did have greater mechanical
reliability. However, though the M26 is often labeled as having poor mobility in Korea, it was
the Sherman that actually had the highest casualty rate to terrain, at 6.4 percent. The rate for the
M26, which was lower, was not identified.54
The greater use of the Sherman in more austere terrain may have been the contributing
factor here. Nonetheless, the M26 and M46 had similar mechanical failure rates at 40.5 and 41.6
respectively.55 The Sherman’s rate was the lowest of any tank used at 20 percent. Still, the ORO
report grounds speculation:
It should be remembered, in any consideration of mechanical failure by types, that
the M4A3 and the M24 by 1950 were products of a long period of development
and modification and hence should be expected to perform with some measure of
reliability. The M46 tanks were the first of this type to be built and their Korean
employment was their first operational test. The M26 tanks were a later World
War II development and were in a generally poor physical condition.56
The report also reveals that the M26 and M24 light tank had the most powerpack issues of any of
the American tanks in country. It states that: “The lack of sufficient power was a primary cause
of mechanical trouble with the 47-ton M26 (500 hp); the 49-ton M46 with an 810 hp air-cooled
engine performed extremely well considering that this was its first real test.”57 A curious blend of
design immaturity infused with aged tanks resulted in a common, if not completely deserved,
negative mobility reputation for the M26 in Korea.
Regardless of its limitations, the M26 played a critical role in stabilizing the American
efforts during the first year of the war. It helped to remove the enemy T-34 from Korea both as a
psychological impactor and as a military consideration. The M26 and other tanks offered support
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well beyond eliminating enemy armor. In addition to providing both direct and indirect artillery
support, protective fires during defense, along with a number of other roles, it possessed the
firepower, mobility, and survivability necessary to carry an attack forward. Many of these roles
were exemplified by the Marine M26 D-23. Had this M26 not traversed the treacherous, icy road
leading from Ha garu-ri to Yudam-ni, a road impassable for the M4, and supported the Marines
in their withdrawn from the Chosin Reservoir, America’s premier fighting force in Korea, the
entire 1st Marine Division, over 20,000 men, would likely have been lost. Ultimately, the M26
was invaluable to U.N. infantry operations during the Korean War, even as it had been crucial in
the anti-armor role.
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Conclusion
American tank technology underwent a revolution during the Second World War. Early
designs, exemplified and culminating with the M4 Sherman, featured a rear mounted engine but
a forward mounted transmission and sprocket. The drive shaft that ran from the engine to the
transmission combined with the Continental R975 radial engine of the earlier models, made the
M4 very tall, displayed by its characteristic side sponsons. In sharp contrast, the T20 series
incorporated many new technological advances and design ingenuities, beginning fresh trends in
American tank development. Its basic design established the standard setup that would become
known as the traditional tank design. It used a rear mounted engine, transmission, and sprocket,
eliminating the drive running the length of the vehicle and, coupled with the lower profile Ford
GAA V8, got rid of the need for side sponsons. It boasted a much lower stance and profile.
The M26 was also the first American tank to pioneer the torsion bar suspension, forgoing
the Horizontal Volute Spring Suspension (HVSS) found on later models of the Sherman. The
torsion bar suspension remains the standard armored fighting vehicle suspension to this day. The
current tank employed by the U.S. Army, the M1 “Abrams” series, represents a revolutionary
departure from the Patton series. Nonetheless, it still possesses many features typical of a
traditional design, such as its rear mounted engine, transmission, and sprocket. The M1 is the
culmination of American design and tank fighting experience, however much of that culminative
developmental achievement can be attributed to the M26. For example, the balance of firepower,
mobility, and armor achieved by the M26 and even more so with its immediate descendent the
M46, was a first for American tank designers. Though the Abrams has far and away more
emphasis placed on survivability, it still follows the M26’s example by placing firepower and
mobility as the greatest priorities.
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From early 1942 to before June 1944, the Sherman was lauded as the best balance of
speed, firepower, and armor to date. Experiences with German armor and Axis anti-tank
weapons in 1944 and 1945, however, revealed it to be quite vulnerable. The Allied advance in
the West continued to march across Europe, but the big German tanks, the “Tiger” and
“Panther,” were dealt with only through the effective use of combined arms, superior armored
force tactics, and extreme bravery on the part of tank crews. The M26, despite arriving in the
latter months of the war, proved itself to be capable of dispatching advanced German designs on
a one-to-one basis. Yet, full effect of the M26’s tank-killing prowess would not be witnessed
until a little more than five years later on the Korean Peninsula.
Nonetheless, American tank development did not end with the Second World War, and
though post-war funding restricted the Ordnance Department to component development, an
improved version of the M26, the M46 “Patton” was built. The M46 addressed the former
interim tank’s powerpack shortfalls and thus gradually replaced the M26 during 1951 in Korea.
Improved designs of the “Patton” series were soon fielded following the war in Korea, namely
the M47, M48, and M60, but the lineage of these designs was never in question.
The M47 was another wartime interim tank. The armor crisis of 1950 revealed the need
for the United States to begin immediate large-scale tank production again. However, the
medium tank T42, which featured a more powerful 90-mm gun, ballistic range finders, and
improved armor, was rejected from consideration because its powerplant was deemed
insufficient by Army Field Forces.1 On the other hand, mass production of the M46 did not make
sense either because it no longer represented the latest technologies available. The arrived at
stopgap solution was to mount the turret of the T42, with the improved T119 90-mm gun, built-
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in Rotoclone blower, and range finders, on the chassis of the proven M46 design. In addition, the
blower at the top-center of the glacis was removed and the plate was angled back to 60 degrees
which gave it comparable frontal armor to the T42.2 Production of the new tank began in June
1951 but it was never fielded in Korea.
While the M47 was being rushed together in the fall of 1950, the Ordnance Department
initiated the designing of a fully modernized and long-term medium tank to eventually replace it.
The design project was given to Chrysler’s Ordnance Development Department in November
1950.3 The final result of their labors was the M48. The new tank was based largely off the T43
heavy tank design, adopting its elliptical cast hull and turret as well as its 85-inch turret ring.4
The T43’s original 120-mm gun was dropped in favor of a 90-mm, however. The improved 90mm T139 matched the ballistic performance of the M47’s T119 but it was lighter. Additionally,
the M48 used the same engine and transmission as the M47. Production began in earnest in
March of 1953.
Neither the M47, nor the M48, enjoyed an especially long service life in United States
military service. The former was a stopgap and the latter was lacking in firepower and
operational range.5 In 1958, the intended replacement of the M48A2, the T95 remained out of
reach because many of its components were experimental and in need of additional development.
With cost and time in mind, yet another half measure solution was implemented. The M48A2
was upgraded with an improved weapon and more fuel-efficient engine, namely the 105-mm gun
T254 and the AVDS-1790 (diesel).6 Because of numerous smaller upgrades the designation was

2

Ibid., 53.
Ibid., 85.
4
Ibid., 83.
5
Ibid., 152.
6
Ibid.
3

117
eventually changed to M60, reflecting its production year. This tank was the only of the series
not to be officially designated “Patton,” however it was the first to be labeled as a Main Battle
Tank (MBT) rather than a medium tank.7 The M60 served as America’s MBT for three decades
and was not replaced until the late 1980’s. In the years before it was replaced its greater height
and mediocre cross-country performance, when compared to European models, drew criticism.
However, the same features, namely its large turret and compartments, and its great mechanical
reliability, gave the design its longevity. Most notably, its spaciousness left room for continued
modernizations and upgrades. The M60 is the culmination of and final representation of the
M26’s lineage.
Ultimately, the M26 “General Pershing” was the patriarch to the iconic Patton series,
which served as America’s front line main battle tanks for four decades of the Cold War. These
tanks saw service with many countries besides the United States and in many corners of the
globe, with many still in service, and many in museums of both friend and foe alike. Somehow,
the M26 still gets forgotten, even with historians; but, the best American tank of the Second
World War and Korea should be remembered.
The only two authors that have stepped up to the challenge of creating a full
remembrance are R.P. Hunnicutt and Steven Zaloga. Hunnicutt did not have access to the most
recently released information on the employment of Armor in Korea and his combat history of
the tank is limited, both in World War II and Korea. Zaloga’s two Osprey books on the M26 are
mostly excellent, but his narrative remains abbreviated, disjointed, and unsympathetic. Though
he does deviate occasionally, his arguments tend to closely align with Hunnicutt’s as well. Every
appearance is that the few dissenting points are thrown in only to differentiate the work enough
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to justifying the sale of Osprey texts to tank enthusiasts. Therefore, the only real histories on the
M26, while packaged differently, arrive in the same voice.
New blood is needed as the study of history is progressed only by discussion, not
accepting facts at face value. Accordingly, the driving purpose of this thesis was threefold: first,
to show that the M26 was important to the study of American military history. Second, to reveal
the need for discussion, and third, to open the way for that discussion. However, Hunnicutt and
Zaloga’s lack of citations make providing much-needed countering arguments a ground-floor
enterprise. Thus, enthusiastic researchers are needed, those who are willing to closely pour over
the primary documents with fresh eyes. Their search will lead to the exciting discovery of new
sources and fruitful historical discussion concerning a tank that has been relegated to the
backstage of American military history for too long.
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